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1.1 Brain and Body
1.1 Brain and Body
Why has evolution equipped us with a brain? What is the purpose of our
cognitive system? When trying to answer these questions, it might be interesting
to have a closer look at species in nature which have developed brains or brain-
like structures and compare their capabilities with existing organisms which have
no brains. In doing so, it becomes immediately obvious that all species that can
perform any kind of movement or action such as insects, fishes or mammals
have at least a rudimentary brain, while biological organisms that cannot act,
re-act or move, like for example trees or corals, have no functioning brain-like
structure. An illustrative example in this context is the ontogenetic development
of sea squirts. At the beginning of their lives, sea squirts are able to swim.
They have a simplified central nervous system consisting of a cerebral ganglion
that controls movements. In other words, sea squirts have simple brains. At a
certain point of time, however, when the animal finds a suitable place to stay,
it stops swimming, attaches itself to a permanent object on the sea ground and
does not move anymore. Interestingly, after settling down, the nervous system
previously used to control movements breaks down immediately and the sea
squirt starts digesting its own brain. Apparently, without the requirement to
move, there is not need for having a brain. One might therefore provocatively
hypothesize that the basic function of the brain is to control motor behavior,
or from a psychological perspective, that the purpose of cognition system is to
serve actions.
Certainly, the example of the degradation of the sea squirts’ nervous system
is merely just an anecdote and does not represent any scientific argument for
the importance of actions in human information processing. Nevertheless, many
theorists in the last decades have proposed action-oriented views on cognition,
which share the basic assumption that the central function of the mind is to guide
actions (for a recent review see, e.g., Wilson, 2002). For example, Churchland,
Ramachandran, and Sejnowski (1994) mention that “vision has its evolutionary
rationale rooted in improved motor control” (p. 25). Glenberg (1997) argue sim-
ilarly and emphasize that “memory evolved in service of perception and action
in a three-dimensional environment” (p. 1). Moreover, Clark (1998) even states
that the traditional distinction between perception, cognition and action may
sometimes obscure our view for a better understanding of the cognitive pro-
cesses and functions. He proposes conceptualizing cognitions as body-related
processes, because “the brain is revealed not as (primarily) the engine of rea-
son or quiet deliberation, but as the organ of environmentally-situated control.
Action, not truth and deductive inference, are the key organizing concepts.”
(p. 268) Following this embodied view on human information processing, each
cognitive mechanism has to be considered in terms of its function in serving
adaptive behavior and its contribution to control motor behavior.
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However, a glimpse inside almost every available cognitive psychology text-
book reveals that most information-processing theories are still dominated by
the traditional assumption that perception, cognition, and action are three inde-
pendent stages in a serial chain of processes (see Donders, 1886; Sternberg,1996).
In these classical approaches, actions are implicitly conceived as a mere conse-
quence of information processing, that is, as stimulus-inducted re-actions or as
“trivial appendages to the seemingly more sophisticated operations subserving
‘higher-level’ cognition” (Fischer & Zwaan, in press). Researchers in this tra-
dition have consequently put much more emphasis on the receptive than on
the productive side of human behavior and aimed in their empirical work to
reduce movement-related processes as far as possible (e.g., by using simple but-
ton press response tasks) in order to isolate them from processes of perception
and cognition. However, the strict separation of motor action from perception
and cognition does not adequately capture the goal-directed nature of human
information processing and intentional behavior (Hommel, 2005; see also Rosen-
baum, 1983, and Abrams & Balota, 1992, for earlier critiques of this approach).
The new generation of cognitive scientists should therefore focus, as for example
suggested by Lakoff & Johnson (1999), on approaches of embodiment and the
close interaction between mind and body and between cognition and action (cf.
Garbarini & Adenzato, 2004).
In the following I will describe four influential theoretical concepts—the ideo-
motor principle, the common coding principle, the principle of motor simulation
and the principle of motor resonance—which have inspired in recent years many
empirical studies and which all suggest a strong coupling between perception
and action on the one hand and between cognition and action on the other.
1.2 Perception and Action
1.2.1 Principle of Ideomotor Action
The notion that action and perception are mutually dependent processes is not
new and dates back to the early days of experimental psychology. Theorists at
the end of the 19th century searched for an answer to the question how voluntary
actions are possible at all and proposed the so-called ideomotor principle, which
basically holds that actions are represented in terms of their sensory effects in
the environment. According to this assumption, human actions are initiated by
nothing other than the idea of the sensorial consequences that typically result
from them. Merely thinking about an action and its intended consequences
prompts and instigates a motor response. Thus, the central mechanism under-
lying the planning of actions is an anticipation of their perceptual effects. The
principle of ideomotor actions has been most dominantly proposed by James
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(1890), whose considerations were strongly influenced by the British and Ger-
man psychologists Carpenter (1852) and Lotze (1852; for an overview of the
historical roots of ideomotor theories see Stock & Stock, 2004). According to
James, learning is a precondition for the control of voluntary actions. Since every
performed movement goes along with a perceivable change in the environment,
the actual motor action and the sensory consequences become associated. Once
the bidirectional connection between action and consequences is established, the
motor response can be initiated by the mere activation of the intended action
effect in the mind (i.e., “Vorstellung des Gewollten”; Lotze, 1852).
The ideomotor theory as it was originally formulated by James represents
a purely introspective approach. Almost a century later, however, Greenwald
(1970a) provided an extension of these considerations, which allows empirical
and experimental validations. He hypothesized that if responses are coded by
representations of their sensory feedback, it implies that the perception of a
stimulus, which closely resembles the consequences of a previously learned ac-
tion, should result in a priming of this particular motor response. And in fact,
Greenwald (1970b) demonstrated that stimuli representing well-known action
effects primed responses that typically produce them. For example, verbal re-
sponses were found to be faster to auditory stimuli then to visual stimuli, be-
cause speaking produces auditory but not visual effects. Several studies have
investigated since then effects of ideomotor compatibility and demonstrated ex-
perimental evidence for an influence of anticipated or perceived action effects on
motor response (e.g., Stu¨rmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz; 2000; Brass, Bekkering,
Wohlschla¨ger, & Prinz, 2000; Kunde, 2001; Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Koch &
Kunde, 2002; Drost, Rieger, Brass, Gunter, & Prinz, 2005). For example, Brass
et al. (2000) demonstrated that the observation of a finger-lifting movement
facilitates the equivalent finger movement even in a simple response task. In-
terestingly, Elsner & Hommel (2001) demonstrated that associations between
actions and their effects are automatically and incidentally learned. Partici-
pants experienced, in an initial learning phase, the co-occurrences between left
and right keypress responses and low- and high-pitched tones, and subsequently
made keypress responses in a free- or forced-choice paradigm. As the reaction
times indicate, the presentation of tones facilitates the execution of left or right
key presses, depending on the previously acquired response-stimulus associa-
tion. Thus, research in the last decades has accumulated empirical support for
the ideomotor hypothesis and demonstrated that participants use automatically
acquired associations between motor responses and perceived consequences for
the planning and initiation of actions.
The notion that the voluntary control of actions involves an anticipation of
intended effects implies that action planning is seen as goal-driven process—a
central assumption that can be also found in some theories of motor control (e.g.,
Jeannerod, 1997; Rosenbaum, Meulenbroek, Vaughan, & Jansen, 2001; Glover;
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2004) and imitation (e.g., Bekkering, & Wohlschla¨ger, 2002). Anticipatory ac-
tion control implies furthermore that action and perception are two functionally
linked cognitive processes. This notion has been adopted in particular by the
framework of common coding (Prinz, 1990; Hommel, Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, &
Prinz, 2001), which tried to integrate the ideomotor principle with concepts and
ideas of modern cognitive psychology. The next section will therefore describe
the common coding principle in greater detail.
1.2.2 Principle of Common Coding
Prinz (1990; 1997) suggested a common coding theory, which aimed at under-
standing the linkages between the “late” products of perceptual processing and
the “early” cognitive antecedents of motor actions. The central assumption of
this model is that perception and action share and operate on common cogni-
tive codes within one representational domain. The common coding principle
has been recently elaborated in greater detail by the Theory of Event Cod-
ing (TEC; Hommel et al. 2001). The model holds that perceived and to-be
produced events, such as intentional actions, are represented by a network of
linked codes of relevant features of the event (the so called ‘event file’). Thus,
in line with many theories on perception, attention, and memory (e.g., Allport,
1987; Singer, 1994, Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992, Treisman, 1996), it
is assumed that stimulus representations are feature-based. However, since per-
ception and action are entirely commensurate, TEC states furthermore that
also action plans are represented in a distributed fashion and comprise in the
same way temporary composites of cognitive codes (i.e., action-feature codes).
Evidence for a feature-based action representation can be found, for instance,
in classical motor control experiments showing that movement initiation times
decrease if subjects have the opportunity to partially make up their action plan
in advance (Rosenbaum, 1980, 1987). In these experiments, participants were
required to perform speeded hand movements consisting of different action fea-
tures (e.g., with the left or right hand, for a short or long distance, toward or
away from the body). Movement precues were presented before the actual go
signal and informed about some or all response parameters. As the response la-
tencies indicated, movements were faster initiated with an increasing number of
precued action features, suggesting that subjects are able to specify the features
of their action relatively independently.
Importantly, according to TEC, the common representation of perception
and action is characterized by a distal coding of event features. That is, feature
codes of perceptual objects and action plans refer to external, that is, distal
features of stimuli or action-generated effects. The model shares this notion
with other approaches to action planning assuming that movement planning
is goal-directed and guided by the desired movement end-states (Rosenbaum
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et al., 2001). However, in contrast to these approaches, TEC holds that motor
behavior is not only guided by proximal action effects such as proprioceptive and
visual feedback of a performed movement. Rather, the common coding principle
suggests that action-generated effects refer to the highest level of representation
and to the remote consequences that the action is supposed to have on the
environment. For example, if one intends to decrease the volume of the music by
turning a knob of the stereo amplifier, the cognitive representation of the planned
action does not refer merely to the muscle contractions or visual feedback of
the rotational movement, but involves instead also the actual intended effect
in the environment, namely, the change of volume. From a theoretical point
of view, the crucial advantage of a distal reference system is that perception
and action can operate on commensurate representations. This does not only
simplify many cognitive processes, like for example the transformation of visual
object properties (e.g., object size) into appropriated motor commands (e.g.
grip aperture) as required while grasping, it also enables the cognitive system to
abstract from domain- and modality-specific coding characteristics by referring
to the informational content of the action or event (Prinz, 1997). The idea of
distal coding of event features is supported by numerous reports in the literature
on both perception and action planning (for a review see Hommel et al., 2001)
and also receives evidence from research on ideomotor actions (see above). As
one recent example, Rieger (2004, 2007) compared participants who were able
to type fluently using the 10-finger-system with participants doing hunt-and-
peck typing with two fingers only. She found that expert typists had built up
an integral representation of fingers movements and the corresponding letters,
resulting in an automatic bidirectional association between motor responses and
distal action effects.
Taken together, the common coding principle holds that representations of
perceived events as well as representations of actions and action-generated ef-
fects are based on the same cognitive codes referring to distal event features. In
this way, perception and action planning can be understood to be functionally
equivalent, because, as argued by Hommel et al. (2001), “they are merely al-
ternative ways of doing the same thing: internally representing external events”
(pp. 860).
1.3 Cognition and Action
The notion that perception and action operate on shared representations raises
the question whether the common coding principle is restricted to the perceptual
domain. Alternatively, it might be possible that the close bidirectional coupling
of mental representations with motor codes is a generalized principle of how
the brain processes and represents information. Indeed, research in the field of
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neuroscience and cognitive psychology has recently indicated that motor repre-
sentations are involved in a wide range of cognitive tasks and contribute even to
rather complex processes such as the understanding of other’s actions (Wilson
& Knoblich, 2005), the processing of language (Glenberg, 1997) and numerical
information (Walsh, 2003). This section will elaborate these ideas in the light
of two further coding principles emphasizing the role of action in cognition.
1.3.1 Principle of Action Simulation
Many studies in animal research and cognitive social psychology have suggested
that motor processes are strongly involved in understanding the behavior of
conspecifics (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005; Prinz, 1997; Rizzolatti & Craighero,
2004). The rationale behind these models can be summarized by the principle
of action simulation: People, who observe somebody else performing an action,
activate the same neural substrates that are recruited when they performed that
action themselves. In other words, action understanding implies an internal,
covered imitation of the observed motor behavior.
Action simulation received recently a lot of attention due to the discovery of
the so called mirror neurons in macaque monkeys, which are sensitive to action
execution as well as action observation (Gallese, Fadiga, Foggassi, & Rizzolatti,
1996; for review, see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). That is, single-cell record-
ings in monkeys’ premotor cortex (in particular area F5) revealed that this type
of neurons increase their firing when the monkey performed an action (e.g.,
grasping a food item) as well as when it observes an experimenter or conspecific
performing a similar action. Importantly, it could be shown that the mirror
system is responsive to the understanding of the action goal and not merely to
the perception of the motor movement. Specifically, the monkey mirror neu-
ron system was shown to respond to goal-directed grasping movements, even
if the final goal (food) was occluded (Umilta`, Kohler, Gallese, Fogassi, Fadiga,
Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2001). As shown by a large number of neuroimaging
studies, a mirror-neuron system similar to that of the monkey likely also ex-
ists in humans (Iacoboni, Woods, Brass, Bekkering, Mazziotta, & Rizzolatti,
1999; Buccino, Binkofski, Fink, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese et al., 2001; Decety,
Chaminade, Grezes, Meltzoff, 2002). This research demonstrates that the ob-
servation of actions performed by others activates a complex network including
the Broca’s area, an inferior frontal brain area considered to be homologous to
area F5 in the macaque monkey, and other cortical regions whose functions are
predominantly motor related (cf. Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).
The notion of action simulation implies furthermore that the observation and
understanding of other’s actions involves previously acquired motor experiences.
In line with this reasoning, it has been shown the activation of the human
mirror system strongly depends on motor knowledge and expertise. For ex-
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ample, Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Gre`zes, Passingham and Haggard (2005) studied
experts in either classical ballet or capoeira dancing (i.e., a Brazilian fight-
dance) and found greater activity in the premotor and parietal brain regions
when dancers watched their own dance style. A follow-up study (Calvo-Merino,
Glaser, Gre`zes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006) ruled out that the differences in
motor activation were not merely the result of visual familiarity. It can be thus
concluded that the motor system is more strongly engaged during action under-
standing when participants have a specific motor representation of the behavior
they observe.
In addition to this neuropsychological work, the idea of action simulation re-
ceives support from behavioral studies. The above described finding of ideomo-
tor compatibility effects during action observation (Brass et al. 2000; Stu¨rmer
et al. 2000) is just one example. Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore (2003) provide
further evidence by showing that people’s attempts to perform an arm move-
ment become more variable when watching an incompatible arm movement.
Similarly, interference effects of action simulation have been found during the
observation of mouth movements. People are faster to pronounce a printed syl-
lable when they see a mouth pronouncing the same syllable than when they see
a mouth pronouncing a different syllable (Kerzel & Bekkering, 2000).
In sum, empirical research shows that the observation of body movements
automatically triggers a sort of covert imitation resulting in an activation of
motor-related brain areas and a facilitated execution of similar motor responses.
These findings suggest that action simulation is a cognitive principle subserving
the conceptual understanding of other’s behavior. Action simulation reflects
thus another example for the involvement of motor representations in cognitive
processing.
1.3.2 Principle of Motor Resonance
The important role of motor representations as it has been described above
clearly points to an embodied information processing approach in perception
and action understanding. This raises the general question whether embodi-
ment can be understood as a universal coding principle also valid for high-level
cognitive processes such as the word reading and the coding of abstract seman-
tic information. Some recent studies on grasping actions provide evidence for
this notion and showed that semantic information effect the planning of actions.
Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani, Daprati, and Gangitano (2000) reported, for
instance, that reach-to-grasp movements are influenced by the semantic prop-
erties of distracting words. They showed that Italian words denoting far and
near reprinted on to-be-grasped objects had comparable effects on movement
kinematics as actual greater or shorter distances between hand position and
object. Automatic word reading effects have also been observed for words im-
9
1 Introduction
plying explicitly or implicitly size-related semantic information. For example,
the maximum grip aperture during reaching has been found to be enlarged after
reading the word large as compared to the word small (Gentilucci & Gangitano,
1998; Glover & Dixon, 2002) or after reading the word apple as compared to
the word grape (Glover, Rosenbaum, Graham, & Dixon, 2004).
Beside this work on motor control, also theoretical work on language com-
prehension has recently highlighted the role of motor information in high-level
cognitive processing (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, Glenberg, 1997; Clark, 1998;
Gallese & Goldman, 1998). These approaches are motivated by the problem of
symbol grounding—a problem that is faced by each theory on semantic knowl-
edge and that represents the basic question of how linguistic symbols such as
words, numbers, or syntactic constructions acquire meaning. Although embod-
ied approaches to cognition differ widely on the emphasis that is put on separate
cognitive subsystems and on the way in which conceptual knowledge is organized
(for recent overviews see Fischer & Zwaan, in press; van Elk, van Schie, Linde-
mann & Bekkering, in press; Barsalou, in press), they all share the assumption
that symbols can become meaningful only when they are somehow mapped to
non-linguistic perceptual experiences and bodily activities. The cognitive sys-
tem operates accordingly on representations that are grounded in perception and
action, or in other words, cognition is based on embodied knowledge. Following
this line of reasoning, theories of semantic representations have been proposed,
which relate abstract concepts to perceptual experiences (Barsalou, 1999) and
motor actions (Glenberg, 1997; Zwaan, 2004). Sharing the assumption that
the comprehension of meaning is a fundamentally body-related process that in-
volves sensorimotor representations, these models predict that the processing of
linguistic stimuli causes a reactivation of perceptual and motoric representations
of the objects and actions that underlie this abstract semantic information. This
automatic activation of embodied representations represents a form of mental
resonances (cf. Zwaan, 2006), which can be subdivided according its modality
into perceptual resonance and motor resonance (see Schu¨tz-Bosbach & Prinz,
2007, for this distinction in the context of social cognition).
Perceptual resonance refers to sensory activation due to mental imagination.
Evidence for this phenomenon is provided by several behavioral experiments on
sentence comprehension (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yax-
ley, 2002; Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003; Kaschak, Madden, Therriault,
Yaxley, Aveyard, Blanchard & Zwaan, 2005). For example, Stanfield and Zwaan
(2001) required participants to verify that a picture (e.g., a pencil) depicted an
object mentioned in a sentence (e.g., “The pencil is in a cup”). They observed
faster responses if the object on the picture was presented in the same orienta-
tion as implied by the sentence (in this case a vertically depicted pencil). Thus,
understanding the sentence appears to call on real perceptual experience.
10
1.4 Summary and Aims
The notion of motor resonance refers to motor activation in semantic process-
ing due to mental simulation or re-enactment (cf. Prinz, 2006). This coding
principle represents therefore the most straightforward conceptualization of the
coupling of action and high-level cognition as it is in the focus of the present
thesis. Importantly, the concept of motor resonance goes far beyond the phe-
nomenon of action simulation, because it does not reflect merely the matching
of perceived actions with existing motor repertoire. Rather, motor resonance
stands for a coding principle to deal with semantic knowledge on an abstract
level of representation and is expected to cause therefore interference also when
processing symbolic information. Evidence for this idea comes from neuroimag-
ing studies showing that reading of action words activates motor-related brain
areas (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermu¨ller, 2004; Pulvermu¨ller, Hauk, Nikulin,
& Ilmoniemi; 2005; Ru¨schemeyer, Brass, & Friederici, 2007) as well as from
behavioral research demonstrating the presence of priming effects on motor re-
sponses while sentence comprehension (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan &
Taylor, 2006; Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; Taylor, Lev-Ari, Zwaan, in press).
For example, Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) found that sentences describing sim-
ple motor actions facilitate the execution of compatible motor responses (i.e.,
Action Sentence Compatibility effect). They asked participants to judge the
sensibility of sentences such as “You gave Andy the pizza” or “Andy gave you
the pizza” by moving the hand from a start button to the Yes button. The loca-
tion of the buttons required a literal movement either toward the body or away
from the body. Participants were faster to execute the motor responses when
the direction of the response matched the direction of the motion described by
the sentence (e.g., making a response towards the body to the sentence “Andy
gave you the pizza”).
1.4 Summary and Aims
Taken together, psychological research offers several ideas and theoretical con-
cepts that suggest that motor representations are involved in different cognitive
functions ranging from low-level cognitive processing such as visual perception
up to high-level cognitive processing such as language processing. Surely, the
four principles of embodied cognitive processing described above—the ideomotor
action principle, the common coding principle, the action simulation principle
and the motor resonance principle—represent only a selection of views on action-
perception and action-cognition coupling among many others in the literature.
They also should not be understood a four disjunctive independent concepts,
since they are interrelated and to some extent even mutually conditional. For
example, action simulation can be conceptualized as a special case of motor res-
onance, the common coding principle implies the principle of ideomotor actions
11
1 Introduction
and the notion of motor resonance can be derived following a few assumptions
from the Theory of Event Coding.
As described above there are ample studies providing support for the inter-
ference effects between action and cognition in different domains. However, it is
still unclear to what extent action intentions affect cognitive coding and whether
there are any limits of motor involvement in information processing. One might
therefore assume that embodiment and the involvement of motor representa-
tions is a generalized universal coding principle, which applies in theory to all
cognitive processes and to the coding of all types of information. Guided by
this hypothesis, the present thesis sought for evidence of motor effects in a wide
range of cognitive domains and aimed to address within this context some open
questions. The following chapters therefore investigated action effects in the
domain of visual processing (Chapter 2), word reading (Chapter 3) and number
processing (Chapters 4 & 5).
Since most of the research on action effects has focused on rather simple one-
dimensional actions like button press responses or bare grasping movements, a
specific aim of this thesis was to explore whether motor interference effects can
be also observed for more complex natural actions, which are directed on an
specific goal and which consist of more than just a single movement. The first
three chapters investigated effects of object manipulations such as the grasping
and turning of an object and the use of a familiar tool. In particular with respect
to the idea that actions are goal-directed and represented by their intended distal
effects (cf. ideomotor and common coding principle), it is interesting to explore
the role of actions goals that are on a higher level in the hierarchy of possible
subgoals. The thesis intends therefore to shed some light on the impact of motor
features that occur at the end of complex motor sequences, like for instance the
intended manipulation after grasping an object or the goal location of the use
of an object. At the end of this introduction I present a short overview of the
empirical work in the following four chapters.
1.4.1 Action and Visual Processing
Chapter 2 focuses on the coupling between perception and the preparation of
natural grasping actions. In three experiments, we established an experimental
paradigm, which allows to investigate cognitive interference effects in the context
of object manipulations and which can be later utilized to study effects on
other cognitive processes. We assumed that the intention and preparation to
manipulate an object affects visual processing. Since each object manipulation
results in a perceivable motion as an action consequence, Chapter 2 aimed in
particular to find evidence for action-inducted effect on motion perception.
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1.4.2 Action and Semantic Processing
Chapter 3 aimed to provide support for the notion that effects of motor prepara-
tion are not restricted to the visual domain. The major question to be addressed
was whether the planning of goal-directed actions interferes with the language-
related processes. We conducted therefore four experiments, which examined
the impact on the preparation to reach out, grasp and use a meaningful object
(i.e., household tool) on the processing on semantic information in different word
reading tasks (e.g., lexical decision task and semantic categorization task).
1.4.3 Action and Number Processing
Chapter 4 aimed to further support the notion of embodiment as a generalized
coding principle and sought for evidence for motor involvement in a high-level
cognitive domain that has not been studied so far. A promising candidate is
the domain of mathematical cognition, because the coding of numbers and the
planning of motor responses (e.g., object grasping) are two cognitive tasks, which
both depend essentially on the same type of information, namely, an accurate
knowledge about size and quantity. In line with this consideration, a study on
the interference between grasping actions and number processing was conducted,
in which participants judged the parity of presented digits and indicated their
decisions by performing either a power or precision grip action.
1.4.4 Intention and Number Processing
Chapter 5 further investigates the representation of numbers and addresses the
phenomenon of the interaction between numerical magnitude information and
lateralized motor responses (i.e., the SNARC effect). Again, we aimed to inves-
tigate the impact of intentions on cognitive processes. With this study, how-
ever, the focus of attention is shifted from the effects of motor intentions to
the effects of coding intentions and cognitive strategies. Two experiments are
reported, which examined whether number representations are influenced by
implicit task requirements in order to test the hypothesis that coding strategies
are responsible for the cognitive coupling between numbers and spatial response
features.
13
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Chapter 2
Action and Visual
Processing
Effects of Object Manipulation on Motion Perception
2 Action and Visual Processing
Abstract. Three experiments investigated the coupling of per-
ception and action in the context of object manipulation. Par-
ticipants prepared to grasp an X-shaped object along one of its
two diagonals and to rotate it in a clock- or counterclockwise
direction. Action execution was triggered by a visual go signal,
consisting of a circle (neutral) or a tilted bar that afforded either
the same (grip-consistent) or an orthogonal type of grip (grip-
inconsistent) as the prepared action involved. Experiment 1 in-
dicates that action preparation facilitates the detections of grip-
consistent and end-state consistent stimuli. In Experiment 2, the
appearances of the go signals induce apparent rotational motions
in a clock- or counterclockwise direction. Interestingly, stimu-
lus detections were faster when apparent motions were consistent
with the manual object rotation. Motion perception was also fa-
cilitated when detections had to be indicated with a foot response
(Experiment 3). In sum, we present evidence for motor-visual
priming of prepared object manipulations on the perception of
visual motions, which suggests a close link between motor and
perceptual representations that goes beyond visuomotor associa-
tions between object properties and afforded actions.
This chapter is based on: Lindemann, O., & Bekkering, H. (under
review). Object manipulation and motion perception: Evidence
for an influence of action planning on visual processing. Jour-
nal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Perfor-
mance.
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2.1 Introduction
Recent behavioral and neuropsychological research suggests a close and bidirec-
tional link between perceptual and motor processes (see e.g., Hommel, Mu¨sseler,
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). Several cueing experiments have shown that vi-
sual images of graspable objects (Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzo-
latti, & Umilta`, 1998) or film sequences of actions of others (Brass, Bekkering, &
Prinz, 2001; Vogt, Taylor, & Hopkins, 2003) prime the motor system and speed
up the initiation of an action when the cue and the motor response are congru-
ent (visuomotor priming). More recent studies report evidence for an effect of
the opposite directionality, i.e., an impact of motor actions on visual processing
(here referred to as motor-visual priming). Action-induced effects on visual at-
tention have been observed in participants performing rather simple actions like
button-press responses (Mu¨sseler & Hommel, 1997; Wu¨hr & Mu¨sseler, 2001;
Kunde & Wu¨hr, 2004), pen movements (Zwickel, Grosjean, & Prinz, 2007),
pointing movements (Deubel, Schneider, & Paprotta, 1998; Bekkering & Pratt,
2004; Linnell, Humphreys, McIntyre, Laitinen, & Wing, 2005) or changes in
hand postures (Hamilton, Wolpert, & Frith, 2004; Miall, Stanley, Todhunter,
Levick, Lindo, & Miall, 2006).
Interestingly, only few studies reported motor-visual priming effects for more
complex and natural motor behaviors like reaching for and grasping an object
(Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti, & Umilta`, 1999; Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, &
Rizzolatti, 2002; Fagioli, Hommel, & Schubotz, 2007). Yet, Craighero et al.
(1999) demonstrated that the processing of a visual stimulus is facilitated if it
affords the same type of grasping response as the subject concurrently intends
to perform. In their paradigm, differently oriented wooden bars had to be
grasped without the aid of sight. A word cue informed the participants about
the orientation of the bar and instructed them to prepare the corresponding
grasping action. However, the actual execution of the prepared motor response
had to be delayed until a visual go signal had been presented. Craighero et
al. (1999) observed faster response if the go signals afforded the same type of
grasping response as the concurrently prepared action. Interestingly, this effect
was also observed when the participants prepared a manual grasping response
but signaled their detection of the visual stimulus with another motor effector
(e.g. by a foot response). These results suggest that the preparation of a
grasping movement facilitates the visual processing of stimuli sharing the same
intrinsic properties and supports the notion of motor-visual priming.
The idea of action-induced attentional effects has received further support
from studies that compared grasping and pointing movements (Bekkering &
Neggers, 2002; Hannus, Cornelissen, Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2005; Fagioli
et al., 2007; Fischer & Hoellen; 2004). For example, it is has been shown
that the intention to grasp an object selectively enhances the processing of
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object properties such as size (Fagioli et al., 2005) and orientation (Bekkering
& Neggers, 2002; Hannus et al., 2005), which indicates that the planning of an
action automatically modulates visual attention toward those object dimensions
that are relevant for the selection and programming of that particular motor
response.
In sum, most of the studies that investigated motor-visual priming effects
either examined rather simple actions and focused on the perception of object
features, which are associated with a particular kind of hand posture and which
are required in each visuomotor transformation for grasping. However, in every-
day life, we reach out and grasp an object in order to use it for a specific purpose.
For instance, depending on whether we wish to open or close a faucet we grasp
it with the intention to rotate it afterwards clock- or counterclockwise. In other
words, almost all our grasping movements are instrumental and directed toward
an action goal1, which involves a certain manipulation of the grasped object.
Although it is widely recognized that the planning of grasping actions strongly
relies on the visual information we receive about the spatial characteristics of
the target object (for review see, e.g., Castiello, 2005) recent research in the
field of motor control demonstrates that an intended object manipulation plays
a crucial role in the selection of an initial reach-to-grasp movement (see e.g.,
Rosenbaum, Meulenbroek, Vaughan, & Jansen, 2001). Empirical support for
this view was derived from the observation that most subjects grasped an ob-
ject they intend to manipulate in a way that allowed them to finish their action
with a comfortable end state even if this implied having to adopt an awkward
initial grip (the so-called end-state comfort effect; see e.g., Rosenbaum, Mar-
chak, Barnes, Vaughan, Slotta, & Jorgensen, 1990; Weigelt, Kunde, & Prinz,
2006). However, until now, the relevance of the desired manipulation and the
role of action goals have been largely neglected in research investigating the
interaction between attentional and motor processes in grasping.
Given that grasping actions are goal-directed and generally guided by the in-
tention to use, displace or control the grasped object, the present study aimed
to investigate the nature of motor-visual priming in the context of object-
manipulations. Because such a motor action always implies a visually per-
ceivable movement and taking into account the importance of visual feedback
for the control of manual actions (cf. Glover, 2004), it is plausible to assume
that especially the domain of visual motion perception is characterized by an
close coupling of action planning and perception. Surprisingly, however, as yet
1We use the term action goal to describe any kind of cognitive representation of changes in
the environment that a person intends to achieve with a motor action. Behavioral goals
can vary in terms of their remoteness, e.g. from proximal goals like grasping the faucet to
more distal goals like filling the bathtub with water or having a bath. In this respect, action
goals are here understood as proximal goals at the level of motor intentions (cf. Jacob &
Jeannerod, 2005).
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little is know about the interference between action and visual motion percep-
tion. It has been shown, for example, that the perception of moving objects
automatically activates responses that correspond spatially to the direction of
the observed motions (Michaels, 1988; Proctor, Van Zandt, Lu, & Weeks, 1993;
Bosbach, Prinz, & Kerzel, 2004). Nevertheless, the only indication so far for an
effect of the reversed directionality, i.e., an impact of action planning on motion
perception, is coming from the finding of action-induced motion biases reported
by Wohlschla¨ger (2000). In his study, participants had to indicate the direction
of ambiguous rotational motion displays while they were turning a knob either
clock- or counterclockwise. Wohlschla¨ger (2000) observed that participants tend
to judge the ambiguous motions in the rotational direction of their current ac-
tion and interpreted this as evidence that visual motion perception is biased by
actions. Thus, the finding of judgment biases provides some first indications
that action planning may indeed facilitate the perceptual processing of visual
motion.
Based on these preliminary findings we conducted three experiments to test
our hypothesis that a prepared object manipulation would modulate visual at-
tention and particularly facilitates the perceptual processing of visual motion in
line with the intended action. In Experiment 1 we established a paradigm to
investigate motor-visual priming effects of object manipulations. Experiment 2
further investigated this effect and tested whether action planning has an impact
on the perception of visual motions. Experiment 3 was conducted to exclude
the possibility that our findings reflect a facilitated action initiation and rather
represent an action-induced effect on motion perception.
2.2 Experiment 1
The aim of our first experiment was to study motor-visual priming effects in the
domain of object manipulation. To this end, we compared the priming effects
of two actions. Following the delayed-response paradigm proposed by Craighero
et al. (1999), we asked participants to prepare themselves to reach out and
grasp an object (object grasping) but added a second action condition in which
participants were additionally required to subsequently rotate the object in a
given direction (object manipulation). However, in both conditions response
execution had to be delayed until the appearance of a visual go signal. The go
signal was either a solid circle (neutral stimulus) or a tilted bar that afforded
the same type of grip as the prepared action involved (grip-consistent stimulus)
or an orthogonal grip (grip-inconsistent stimulus). For both action conditions
we predicted a motor-visual priming effect, i.e., faster responses toward grip-
consistent stimuli as compared to neutral stimuli.
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We assumed that the process of planning to grasp an object in order to ma-
nipulate it afterwards is strongly influenced by the purpose of the movement,
e.g. the required end position of the object (see e.g., Rosenbaum et al., 2001).
Assuming that the goal of an action already affects the process of motor prepa-
ration in its earliest stages, we hypothesized that the reach-to-grasp movements
prepared for different purposes (i.e., merely holding the object or rotating the
object) would affect visual attention differently. Hence, for the present experi-
ment we predict faster detections of grip-consistent stimuli in both action con-
ditions. Since we assume that in the manipulation condition the grasping and
rotation of the object is considered and prepared while the initial reach-to-grasp
movement is being planned, in this condition we additionally expected to find
a facilitated processing of visual features corresponding to the end state of the
object rotation.
2.2.1 Method
Participants
Twenty-eight students from the Radboud University Nijmegen participated in
the experiment in return for 4.50 Euros or course credits. All were naive to the
purpose of the study, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were free of
any motor problems that could have affected their task performance.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Participants were required to perform grasping movements toward an X-shaped
object (manipulandum; see Figure 2.1B) consisting of two perpendicularly in-
tersecting wooden bars (8 by 1.1 by 5 cm each) mounted on a base plate (30
by 15 cm). The manipulandum could be rotated around its crossing point with
the rotation axis being parallel to the Cartesian y-axis. Owing to small pegs
underneath the manipulandum and holes inside the base plate, it clicked into
place after rotating it for a multiple of 90◦. This mechanism enabled us to keep
the orientation of the manipulandum at the beginning of each trial constant
even when participants were required to rotate the object. A small pin placed
on the base plate at a distance of 15 cm from the manipulandum’s rotation
axis marked the starting position for the grasping movements (see below). The
manipulandum, which was oriented such that the crossing bars were aligned 45◦
diagonally to the subject’s midsagittal plane, was positioned behind a wooden
screen (height: 44 cm, width: 45 cm) allowing the participants to reach it com-
fortably with their right hand but obscuring it and their hand from view (see
Figure 2.1A).
All stimuli were presented in the center of a computer screen that was placed at
a viewing distance of approximately 70 cm in front of the participants, allowing
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Figure 2.1: A: Illustration of the experimental setup. Participants were seated in front
of a computer screen. The starting position and the manipulandum were obscured from the
participant’s view by means of a wooden screen. B: Illustration of the X-shaped manipulandum
that could be rotated along the rotation axes indicated by R. C: Visual stimuli that served as
go signals in all three experiments.
them an unobstructed view of the monitor. The Dutch words LINKS (left) and
RECHTS (right) served as action cues to indicate the required motor response (a
left or a right grasp) in a particular trial. Black bars (subtending a visual angle
of 4.1◦ by 1.3◦) tilted from the vertical for either -45◦ or +45◦ or a solid circle
(visual angle of 2.7◦) served as go signals (see Figure 2.1C). Thus, depending
on the required motor response, a go signal could afford the same type of grip
as currently prepared action involved (grip-consistent) or it could afford the
orthogonal grip (grip-inconsistent). The solid circle, which did not afford any
specific type of grip, served as neutral go signal.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two action conditions. Partici-
pants in the condition ‘object grasping’ had to grasp the object and hold it for
a second without lifting it before returning the hand to the starting position.
Participants in the condition object manipulation, however, were additionally
required to rotate the object 90◦, either clockwise (CW) or counterclockwise
(CCW). In both conditions the manipulandum had to be grasped along one of
its two crossing bars: either with the index finger at the top-left and thumb at
the bottom-right leg (called left grasp) or with the index finger at the top-right
and thumb at the bottom-left leg (right grasp). In the manipulation condition
a left grip needed to be followed by a CW rotation and a right grip by a CCW
rotation.
Prior to the actual experiment participants performed two short pre-experi-
mental blocks. In the first block participants were required to reach out and
simulate to grasp different bars, presented at different location on the computer
screen. The bars were oriented -45◦ or +45◦ similar to the go signals in the
experimental block and had always to be grasped with thumb and index finger
to be placed at the bars’ ends. With this block, we ensured that all participants
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associated with each bar orientation the same particular type of grip. In the
second block, participants practiced grasping and rotating the manipulandum
in the way described above. When the responses were carried out incorrectly,
the experimenter corrected the participants and again demonstrated the correct
action. Only when participants were able to carry out the movements fluently
without vision was the experimental block started.
At the beginning of each trial the participants fixated their eyes on a gray
cross presented on the monitor and positioned their hand in the starting position
by placing their index finger and thumb around the start peg after which the
cross disappeared and the action cues were presented for 2,000 ms. At this
point the participants prepared the required action but needed to withhold its
initiation. After a random interval between 250 ms and 750 ms the go signal
appeared and remained visible for 1,000 ms. After appearance of the go signal
participants’ had to initiate their prepared motor response as soon as possible.
After holding or rotating the manipulandum they returned their hands to the
starting position.
Design
Apart from 10 randomly determined practice trials at the beginning, the ex-
perimental block comprised 144 trials presented in a random order. They were
composed of all possible combinations of the two manual responses (left grasp,
right grasp) and the three types of go signals (circle, bar tilted -45◦, bar tilted
+45◦). Depending on the prepared response, each go signal could be considered
as grip-consistent, grip-inconsistent or neutral. Additionally, the experimental
design contained the between subject factor Action Condition (object grasping,
object manipulation).
Data acquisition and analysis
To record the hand movements we used an electromagnetic position tracking
system (miniBIRD 800TM , Ascension Technology Corporation). Three sensors
were attached to the thumb, index finger, and wrist of the participant’s right
hand. The hand movements were recorded with a sampling rate of 100 Hz and
analyzed off-line. We applied a fourth-order Butterworth lowpass filter with
a cut-off frequency of 10 Hz on the raw data. The onset of a reach-to-grasp
movement was defined as the moment when the tangential velocity of the index-
finger sensor first exceeded a threshold of 10 cm/s. For the movement offsets
we used the reversed criteria, i.e. the time when the tangential velocity first
dropped below this threshold. For both experimental conditions we computed
the mean reaction times (RT; i.e., mean time elapsed between the appearance
of the go signal and the onset of the ensuing reach-to-grasp movement).
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Table 2.1: Mean Reaction Times (in ms) in Experiment 1. The Values in Parentheses Rep-
resent Standard Errors.
Object Grasping Object Manipulation
Response GC GI N GC GI N
Grasping “Left” 336 (17) 344 (18) 353 (17) 367 (17) 369 (18) 388 (17)
Grasping “Right” 323 (15) 339 (16) 332 (15) 361 (15) 368 (16) 377 (15)
Mean 330 (16) 341 (16) 342 (15) 364 (16) 368 (16) 383 (15)
Note. GC = grip consistent; GI = grip inconsistent; N = neutral.
In all experiments reported in this chapter, anticipation responses (response
ahead of onset of the go signal and RTs<150 ms), missing responses (no reactions
and RTs>800 ms) and incorrect actions (e.g. wrong grip, cessations of movement
while reaching, incorrect rotation) were considered errors and excluded from the
statistical analyses. A type-I error rate of α=.05 was used in all statistical tests.
Whenever appropriate, pairwise post-hoc comparisons were conducted using the
Bonferroni procedure.
2.2.2 Results
Anticipations occurred in 10.4% of all trials (6.1% concerned responses ahead
of the go signal and 4.3% RTs <150 ms). The rate of missing (< 1%) and
incorrect responses (2.5%) was low reflecting that the participants had carefully
complied with the instructions concerning planning and execution of the required
responses.
We applied a repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)2
with the within-subject factors Manual Response (left grasp, right grasp) and
Grip Consistency of the go signal (consistent, inconsistent, neutral) and the
between-subject factor Action Condition (object grasping, object manipulation)
on the RT data (see Table 2.1). The analysis revealed a simple main effect for
the factor Manual Response indicating faster initiations of right grasps (350 ms)
than of left grasps (360 ms), F (1, 26) = 3.57, p < .05. Apparently, right grasps
were easier to perform as this is the natural manner to reach out for the manip-
ulandum with the right hand. Importantly, the main effect of Grip Consistency
was significant, F (2, 25) = 9.95, p < .001. As anticipated, the response latencies
to grip-consistent stimuli (346 ms) were shorter than those to grip-inconsistent
(354 ms), t(27) = −2.28, p < .05 and neutral stimuli (362 ms), t(27) = −4.57,
p < .001. The main effect for Action Condition, F (1, 26) = 2.39, p = .13,
and the interaction of Action Condition and Grip Consistency, F (1, 25) = 1.79,
p = .18, did not reach significance.
2We used the multivariate F -test based on the Pillai-Bartlett V criterion for all within-subject
factor analyses reported here (cf. O’Brien & Kaiser, 1985).
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Figure 2.2: Mean effects in the response la-
tencies of Experiment 1 as a function of the
factors Action Condition and Grip Consis-
tency. Effects are defined as the deviation
from the participant’s mean RT in the neu-
tral condition. Error bars represent stan-
dard errors.
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To examine the grip consistency effects in more detail, we calculated for each
subject in the two action conditions the deviation of the mean RT to grip-
consistent and inconsistent stimuli from the mean RT to neutral circles. The
resulting RT effects are depicted in Figure 2.2 and tested with one-sample t-tests
for reliability. As expected, in the object grasping condition action preparation
resulted in a significant facilitory effect on the detections of a grip-consistent
stimuli, t(13) = 2.96, p < .05, and did not affect the detections of grip-
inconsistent stimuli, |t(13)| > 1. Interestingly, however, the pattern of effects
in the object manipulation condition was different. When intending to ma-
nipulate the object not only grip-consistent, t(13) = 3.45, p < .01, but also
grip-inconsistent stimuli—which are here consistent with the end state of the
manipulation—were processed faster, t(13) = 2.16, p < .05.
2.2.3 Discussion
Taken together, the perceptual processing of visual bars was facilitated (as com-
pared to neutral solid circle) when participants prepared an action that involved
the same type of grip as afforded by the go signal. Hence, a motor-visual prim-
ing effect for grip-consistent stimuli was present in both the object grasping and
the object manipulation condition. Interestingly, however, besides the finding of
priming induced by prepared object manipulations, Experiment 1 also revealed
differences in the effect patterns of the two conditions. Whereas, in the object
grasping condition the detection times for bars in a grip-inconsistent orientation
did not differ from the detection times for neural circles, in the object manip-
ulation conditions RTs showed faster processing of bars in both grip-consistent
and inconsistent orientations relative to neutral circles. For an adequate inter-
pretation of these results it is important to note that grip-inconsistent stimuli in
the manipulation condition were always consistent with the hand posture after
having rotated the object by 90◦, or, in other words, grip-inconsistent stimuli
were always consistent with the end state of the required object manipulation.
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We therefore conclude that the faster responses in the manipulation condition
reflect an impact of the prepared object manipulation and indicate a facilitated
processing of visual features consistent with the required action end states.
Taken together, the dissociation of RT effects between the two action con-
ditions of Experiment 1 suggest that the participants prepared the manual ro-
tation of the manipulandum in advance and provides a first indication that
motor-visual priming effects are not restricted to the processes of visuomotor
transformation required for the grip selection and is influenced the intended
object manipulation. However, since this interpretation is based on multiple
t-tests of the effects in the two action conditions and because of the weak sta-
tistical interaction between the factors Action Condition and Grip Consistency
in the MANOVA, additional empirical evidence is clearly warranted. Thus, to
test our hypothesis that motor-visual priming depends on the intended object
manipulation we performed a second experiment, which is detailed next.
2.3 Experiment 2
Experiment 1 had yielded faster responses to stimuli affording the same type
of grip as the currently prepared action and hence suggested that motor-visual
priming effects not only depend on the selection of the initial grip but are also
influenced by the end state of the intended movement. With our second exper-
iment we aimed to test the idea that motor-visual priming indeed goes beyond
visuomotor associations between intrinsic object properties and afforded grip.
Given that the most basic function of any manual action is to cause changes in
our physical world and that the use of an object generally involves an object dis-
placement, the visual perception of motions should be sensitive to the planning
of manual object-directed actions. Thus, when people intend to rotate an object
and prepare the manipulation in advance this should result in a motor-visual
priming of motions related to the intended object displacement.
In Experiment 2 we again used the object manipulation of Experiment 1 but
made a crucial modification: before the go signal appeared participants were
presented with a stimulus either consisting of a horizontal or a vertical bar.
Due to that initial stimulus, the go signal could induce an apparent 45◦ CW
or CWW rotation (see Figure 2.3). Assuming that the participants prepare
the actual manipulation before the onset of the reach-to-grasp movement, we
predicted a facilitated processing of the rotational motions in the same direction
as the intended object rotation.
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Figure 2.3: Apparent visual motions caused by the sequence of stimuli in Experiment 2 and
3. Depending on the orientation of initial bar (i.e., horizontal or vertical) the appearance of
the go signal (i.e., -45◦ or +45◦ tiled bar) induced an apparent rotational motion in a clock- or
counterclockwise direction. The neutral condition, in which the go signal (i.e., a solid circle)
did not induce an apparent motion, is not depicted in this figure.
2.3.1 Method
Participants
Thirty students from the Radboud University Nijmegen participated in exchange
for 4.50 Euros or course credits. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision
and were naive to the purpose of the experiment.
Apparatus and stimuli
The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1. Also the go signals were un-
changed. In contrast to Experiment 1, in all trials an initial stimulus consisting
of either a horizontal or vertical bar was presented in the center of the screen
that remained visible until the go signal appeared. The initial stimulus had the
same size and was presented at the same location as go signals. Note that the
go signals were identical to the ones used in Experiment 1. However, due to the
presence of an initial bar the appearance of a go signal could induce an apparent
rotational motion (see Figure 2.3 for an illustration). For example, the presen-
tation of a +45◦ tiled bar resulted in apparent CW motion if initial stimulus
was oriented vertically and in a CCW motion of it was oriented horizontally.
When the circle served as go signal, there was no apparent motion (no rotation).
Additionally, we didn’t cue the action preparation by words, as we did in Ex-
periment 1, because the appearance of a word stimulus would have masked the
initial stimulus strongly. Instead, now we presented as action cue a small blue
or yellow cross (0.9◦ of visual angle) on top of the vertical or horizontal bar.
Procedure and design
The procedure was basically the same as in Experiment 1, including the pre-
experimental and practice blocks. Participants were instructed to always grasp
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Table 2.2: Mean Reaction Times (in ms) in Experiments 2 and 3. The Values in Parentheses
Represent Standard Errors.
Vertical Initial Bar Horizontal Initial Bar
Manual Response RC RI NR RC RI NR
Experiment 2
Left-CW 324 (21) 354 (24) 334 (20) 322 (21) 344 (24) 332 (20)
Right-CCW 337 (21) 339 (23) 354 (24) 307 (21) 340 (23) 330 (24)
Mean 331 (21) 347 (23) 344 (22) 314 (21) 343 (23) 331 (22)
Experiment 3
Left-CW 328 (17) 341 (15) 330 (18) 327 (18) 322 (15) 323 (19)
Right-CCW 326 (16) 334 (19) 340 (19) 311 (16) 326 (19) 330 (15)
Mean 327 (16) 338 (17) 335 (18) 320 (17) 324 (16) 327 (17)
Note. RC = rotation consistent; RI = rotation inconsistent; NR = no rotation; Left-
CW = grasping “left” & turning clockwise; Right-CCW = grasping “right” & turning
counterclockwise.
and rotate the manipulandum. Half of the participants were presented with the
horizontal and the other half with the vertical bar as initial stimulus. Each trial
began with the presentation of a gray cross projected on top of the initial stim-
ulus. As soon as the participants had placed their hand in the starting position,
the color of the cross changed to cue the preparation of the object manipulation
(remaining visible for 2,000 ms). Blue indicated a left grasp (the index finger at
the top-left and the thumb at the bottom-right leg of the manipulandum) and
a 90◦ CW rotation, whereas yellow prescribed a right grasp (index finger at the
top-right and thumb at the bottom-left leg) and a 90◦ CCW rotation. After a
random interval (250-750 ms) the initial stimulus disappeared and the go signal
was presented for the duration of 1,000 ms.
The experimental block again comprised 144 trials consisting of all possi-
ble combinations of the two manual response (left grasp/CW rotation, right
grasp/CCW rotation) and the three types of go signals (circle, bar tilted -45◦,
bar tilted +45◦). The orientation of the initial bar (horizontal, vertical) was bal-
anced between subjects. Depending on the induced apparent rotation, the go
signals were either consistent or inconsistent with the prepared object rotation.
Data acquisition and analysis
Data acquisition and analysis were identical to Experiment 1.
2.3.2 Results
As in Experiment 1, participants had the tendency to anticipate the go signals
(14.9% anticipations; 4.9 % of RTs<0 ms and 10.4% of RTs<150 ms). 8.4 % of
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Figure 2.4: Mean effects (i.e., deviations
from the neutral condition) in the response
latencies of Experiment 2 as a function of
the factors Rotation Consistency and Grip
Consistency. Error bars represent standard
errors.
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the actions were performed incorrectly (i.e., no response or wrong grip or wrong
object rotation).
A three-way MANOVA was performed on the mean RTs with the within-
subject factors Manual Response (left grasp/CW rotation, right grasp/CCW
rotation) and Rotation Consistency (consistent, inconsistent, neutral) and one
between-subject factor Initial Bar Orientation (horizontal, vertical). The mean
RTs are shown in Table 2.2. As hypothesized, there was a simple main effect
for Rotation Consistency, F (2, 27) = 9.75, p < .001. All other effects failed to
reach significance. Post-hoc t-tests yielded shorter RTs to go signals that were
consistent with the rotational direction of the action (322 ms) than inconsistent
(345 ms), t(29) = −4.16, p < .001, or neutral signals (338 ms), t(29) = −3.31,
p < .01.
Since the go signals were identical to the ones used in Experiment 1, they
could also be regarded as consistent, inconsistent or neutral with respect to
the required grip. To be precise, with the horizontal bar all rotation-consistent
stimuli were simultaneously consistent with the required grip, whereas with the
vertical bar grip and rotation consistencies were opposed. A separate MANOVA
with the factor Grip Consistency was performed and did not yield any effects in
the mean RTs toward grip-consistent (327 ms), grip-inconsistent (326 ms) and
neutral go signals (329 ms), F (2, 31) = 1.05.
In order to compare the effects of Rotation and Grip Consistency directly and
to see whether the two factors interacted, we analyzed the RT effects further.
For each subject we calculated the deviations of the mean RTs to the grip-
consistent and grip-inconsistent bars from the mean RTs to the neutral solid
circles. The resulting RT effects were submitted to a univariate analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) with the factors Rotation Consistency (consistent, inconsistent)
and Grip Consistency (consistent, inconsistent). Averaged RT effects are de-
picted in Figure 2.4. As could be expected from the results of the analyses above,
the main effect for Rotation Consistency was highly significant, F (1, 56) = 9.61,
p < .003, whereas there was no effect for Grip Consistency, F < 1. This in-
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dicates a facilitated detection of stimuli eliciting consistent apparent rotations
but, in contrast to Experiment 1, no impact on the detection of grip-consistent
stimuli. Interestingly, the two factors did not interact, F < 1, showing that
the rotation consistency effects were independent from the orientation (i.e., grip
affordance) of the go signal.
2.3.3 Discussion
In Experiment 2 responses were speeded up when the appearance of the go signal
induced an apparent rotational motion in the same direction as the prepared
object manipulation. Intriguingly, the priming effects of grip-consistent stimuli
as found for the static stimuli in Experiment 1 had disappeared. Possibly, the
apparent motions were more salient, and had therefore a stronger impacted
on the detection of the go signals, than a static intrinsic stimulus feature like
orientation.
We conclude that the observed perception-action interferences reflect motor-
visual priming and indicate a perceptual benefit for consistent visual motions.
That is, we interpret our findings as evidence of an impact of action planning on
the visual processing of motions. However, since in Experiment 2 the execution
of the manual actions was coupled with the motion detections we cannot rule
out an alternative explanation in terms of a stimulus-response priming effect.
In other words, rather than an action-induced effect on perception, the response
latency differences might reflect an accelerated initiation of manual object rota-
tions consistent with the visual motion, i.e., visuomotor priming (cf. Craighero
et al., 1998; Vogt et al., 2003) at the level of response execution, which would
be an effect of opposite directionality. Thus, we conducted a third experiment
to distinguish between these two possible interpretations.
2.4 Experiment 3
With this third experiment we sought to substantiate our assumption that the
RT differences in Experiment 2 reflected a motor-visual priming of motion per-
ception rather than stimulus-response priming. Again, participants prepared
one of two object manipulations. However, this time the onset of the visual
stimulus did not prompt the execution of the grasping response. Instead, par-
ticipants were asked to signal the motion detections by pressing a foot pedal
and to postpone the execution of the prepared object manipulation until the
presentation of later in the trial (i.e., following a second auditory go signal).
The rationale of Experiment 3 was as follows: if, as hypothesized, the prepara-
tion of a manual response indeed facilitates the perception of consistent motions,
we should observe a similar priming effect when the motion detections to be in-
dicated with another effector system, in this case the foot (cf. Craighero et al.,
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1999; Fagioli et al., 2007). By contrast, if the alternative explanation holds that
in Experiment 2 the perception of motions accelerated the initiation of object
manipulations in the same direction, we should not find any effects on the execu-
tion of the foot responses, because they were identical in all trials and unrelated
to the rotational stimulus motions.
2.4.1 Method
Participants
Fifteen students from the Radboud University Nijmegen participated in ex-
change for 6 Euros or course credits. All had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and were na¨ıve to the purpose of the experiment.
Apparatus and stimuli
The apparatus and stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 2. To
record the foot responses we placed a foot pedal (conventionally used by percus-
sionists to play the bass drum) under the table and attached a motion-tracking
sensor to the end of the pedal’s drumstick (17.5 cm long). When the pedal
had been pressed a sinusoid 440-Hz tone (50 ms duration) sounded to indicate
a correct response. However, when participants responded before the onset of
the visual go signal they were given negative auditory feedback (4400 Hz lasting
200 ms). The auditory go signal triggered the execution of the prepared manual
action and consisted of a 900-Hz tone (150 ms duration).
Procedure and design
Comparable with the previous experiment, the participants were again visually
cued to prepare to grasp and rotate the manipulandum. However, in contrast to
Experiment 2, they were now required to make a foot response with their right
foot as soon as the visual stimulus appeared. The auditory go signal indicating
the initiation of the manual action was presented 600 ms after the foot response
had been given.
Experiment 3 was divided into four blocks of 48 trials each. In contrast to
Experiment 2, the orientation of the initial bar was now varied blockwise within
subjects: half of the participants saw a horizontal bar in blocks 1 and 3 and a
vertical bar in blocks 2 and 4 and for the other half the order was reversed.
Data acquisition and analysis
Data acquisition and analysis were identical to those employed in Experiment 2
with the exception that we used a fourth motion-tracking sensor to measure the
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Figure 2.5: Mean effects (i.e., deviations
from the neutral condition) in the foot re-
sponse latencies of Experiment 3 as a func-
tion of factors Rotation Consistency and
Grip Consistency. Error bars represent stan-
dard errors.
foot responses. We used the same method (i.e., velocity threshold of 10 cm/s) to
determine the foot response latencies as for the hand response in Experiment 1
and 2.
2.4.2 Results
Due to an incorrect execution of the delayed object manipulation 4.7% of the
foot responses were excluded from the analysis. Anticipatory foot responses
occurred in only 2.6%.
The three-way MANOVA of the foot RTs with the within-subject factors Man-
ual Response (left grasp/CW rotation, right grasp/CCW rotation) and Rota-
tion Consistency (consistent, inconsistent, neutral) and Initial Bar Orientation
(horizontal, vertical) revealed a simple main effect for Rotation Consistency,
F (2, 13) = 4.34, p < .05 (see Table 2.2 on page 27). Post-hoc t-tests yielded
shorter RTs for responses following visual go signals that were consistent with
the planned rotation (320 ms) than for inconsistent (332 ms), t(14) = −3.08,
p < .01, and neutral signals (332 ms), t(14) = −3.30, p < .01. Additionally,
there was a trend to an interaction between the factors Manual Response and
Rotation Consistency, F (2, 13) = 3.0, p = .08, which reflects the tendency to
smaller rotation-consistency effects when a left grasp and CW rotation was re-
quired. There were no further significant effects (all F s< 1.8).
To compare rotation and grip consistency effects we performed a separate
analysis. Like in Experiment 2, we calculated the RT effects of the presentation
of the tilted bars (defined as deviations from the RT for the neutral stimulus) per
subject for all conditions and entered this data into a two-way MANOVA with
the factors Grip Consistency (consistent, inconsistent) and Rotation Consis-
tency (consistent, inconsistent). Again, there was no effect for Grip Consistency,
F (1, 14) < 1, but a significant effect for Rotation Consistency, F (1, 14) = 5.46,
p < .05, indicating a facilitated perception of consistent rotational motions rel-
ative to the neutral, no motion condition, while no differences were found for
inconsistent motions.
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2.4.3 Discussion
The foot-response latencies of Experiment 3 replicated the effects of Experi-
ment 2, i.e., faster foot responses were made toward stimuli inducing an ap-
parent rotation consistent with the prepared object manipulation. Because the
detection of the motions and their signaling took place before the manual action
had to be executed, and since the foot responses were unrelated to the visual
stimuli, we can exclude the existence of stimulus-response priming at the level of
response initiation. Thus, the results of Experiment 3 support the assumption
of motor-visual priming: a facilitated perceptual processing of visual motions in
the same direction as the intended object manipulation. This shows furthermore
that motor-visual priming occurs already after action preparation and even in
the absence of the execution of the response.
2.5 General Discussion
The results of the present study indicate that action planning has an impact on
the perceptual processing of visual motions. Experiment 1 showed action-related
effects of object manipulation on visual perception. Whereas in the object grasp-
ing condition only a grip-consistency effect was found, we observed in the object
manipulation condition a grip-consistency effects as well as a facilitated process-
ing of stimuli consistent with the end state of the required object manipulation.
The data demonstrated that the preparation to manipulate an object facilitates
the perception of stimuli that afford the same type of grip as the currently pre-
pared action involved. Moreover, it indicated that motor-visual priming might
not be restricted to the perception of grip-consistent stimuli but could also af-
fect the processing of stimuli related to other states and features of the intended
action. Experiment 2 investigated further the nature of motor-visual priming.
When the appearance of the visual go signal induced an apparent rotational
motion we observed a benefit for the perception of rotation-consistent motions.
The effects of grip and end-state consistency disappeared. Importantly, the
same effects on motion perception were also present in Experiment 3 in which
the manual response was unrelated to the motion detection and participants in-
dicated the detection of the visual stimuli by pressing a foot pedal. This finding
clearly rejects the alternative interpretation of stimulus-response priming. In
conclusion, the present findings demonstrate that planning an action facilitates
the processing of visual motions if they are consistent with the intended action.
The observed action-induced effects on perception indicate a modulation of vi-
sual attention as a result of motor-visual priming and suggest a bidirectional link
between motor and perceptual representations that goes beyond the visuomotor
association of superficial motor-object characteristics.
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As mentioned in the introduction section, we are not the first to demonstrate
action-induced effects on visual attention (cf. Craighero et al., 1999; Mu¨sseler &
Hommel, 1997; Wohlschla¨ger, 2000; Bekkering & Neggers, 2002; Hannus et al.,
2005; Fagioli et al.; 2007). These earlier studies, however, reported effects for
simple motor responses (i.e., key presses or mere grasping actions) on the visual
processing of intrinsic object properties (e.g. location or orientation) that are
relevant for the programming of an object-directed motor action (e.g. grasp-
ing or pointing). The present study extends these findings to the domain of
object manipulations. Furthermore, we demonstrate that action planning not
only has an impact on the processing of visual object properties but also on the
perception of visual motions. Although there is evidence that the perception of
motions facilitates the selection of compatible motor responses (cf. Bosbach et
al., 2004), to date little was known about the reversed effect. Wohlschla¨ger’s
study (2000) gave some indications for an action-induced priming of motion
perception by showing that the participants’ direction judgments of ambiguous
apparent motion were systematically biased toward the rotational direction of a
simultaneously performed turning action. Although it cannot be excluded that
the effects in such a paradigm may have been caused by a guessing bias in per-
ceptually unclear situations rather than a perceptual bias, Wohlschla¨ger’s (2000)
observations were in line with the idea that the planning and execution of mo-
tor actions affect the visual processing of motions. With the present paradigm
we excluded the possibility of biases caused by guessing. The observed differ-
ences in the detection latencies of apparent motions thus provide new evidence
for action-induced effects on motion perception. Furthermore, our experimen-
tal design allowed the detection of attentional effects induced by goal-directed
actions consisting of more than just a single movement: the data showed a
motor-visual priming of motions when participants prepared a more complex
motor sequences such as reaching, grasping and manipulating an object. Note
that the effects occurring in the onset of the reaching movements were driven
by a movement (i.e., the object rotation) that had to be performed later in the
motor sequence. This indicates that participants prepared the actual object
manipulation before the reach-to-grasp movement was initiated. Consequently,
the effects of the object manipulation can be interpreted as evidence for a goal-
directed action planning and they stress the impact of action intentions (e.g.
rotating the object) on the process of early movement selection (see Jeannerod,
1999). This would underpin the recent model of motion control proposed by
Rosenbaum et al. (2001), which states that grip selection depends on the in-
tended object manipulation and is mainly affected by the desired end position
of the movement. The relevance of end postures in action planning might then
also account for our observation in Experiment 1 that visual detections were fa-
cilitated when stimuli were consistent with the end state of the required rotation
(i.e., grip inconsistent stimuli).
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Craighero et al. (1999) had earlier reported priming effects of prepared reach-
to-grasp movements. The present experiment replicates their findings and ad-
ditionally controls for a potential confounding that made it difficult to interpret
their reaction-time differences as action-related effects. In contrast to our study
in which we used a single object in a constant orientation, Craighero and col-
leagues (1999) required participants to grasp bars positioned in different orien-
tations that were each associated with one specific type of grip. The authors
observed faster responses when the go signals afforded the same action as the to-
be-grasped object. Since the actions were determined by the object orientation,
it is unclear whether the stimulus detections interacted with the prepared ac-
tion or with the representation of the to-be-grasped object. That is, it might be
possible that priming effects were fully independent from the concurrent motor
intention and were instead driven by an overlap of visual object properties (e.g.
object orientation or grip affordances) between the go signal and the object.
With the present paradigm, however, we can clearly reject this alternative ac-
count because participants had to grasp one object, whose orientation remained
stable, in two different ways. That is, the same manipulandum was always as-
sociated with both grasping responses. Consequently, the grip-consistent effects
in Experiment 1 were not triggered by the to-be-grasped object but emanated
from the prepared action. This interpretation received additional empirical sup-
port from our findings of visual motion priming in Experiments 2 and 3, which
indicated the presence of an impact of the intended rotation and ruled out the
possibility of a consistency effect between the object and go signal.
A facilitatory motor-visual priming effect seems to conflict with studies that
reported an impaired accuracy in the identification of stimuli that shared fea-
tures with a prepared action (the so called action-effect blindness; Mu¨sseler &
Hommel, 1997; Wu¨hr & Mu¨sseler, 2001; Kunde & Wu¨hr, 2004). For exam-
ple, Mu¨sseler and Hommel (1997) presented left- and right-pointing arrowheads
shortly before the execution of a manual left or right keypress response and
found impaired identifications for arrows that corresponded to the action (e.g.,
if a left-pointing arrowhead appeared while planning a left keypress). A crucial
difference between the findings of motor-visual priming and action-effect blind-
ness is that the former effect represents a reaction-time effect in a speeded task,
whereas the latter effect was found in the accuracy of unspeeded perceptual
judgments. Although there is evidence that these methodological differences
could account for the disparate perceptual effects (Santee & Egeth, 1982), we
argue that also from a theoretical point of view the two findings are not in con-
tradiction. The impaired accuracy in the perception of action-consistent stimuli
has mostly been explained within a common coding framework (cf. Theory of
Event Coding; Hommel et al., 2001), which suggests that perception and action
planning use shared codes that can represent the features of both perceived stim-
uli and prepared actions (see e.g., Wu¨hr & Mu¨sseler, 2001). Accordingly, the
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preparation of an action and its maintenance in memory results in an integra-
tion of all required feature codes into one coherent action plan. Once a feature
code becomes integrated it is bounded and, as a consequence, less available for
another integration such as required for the representation of a perceptual event.
However, the likelihood that a certain feature code has to be integrated when
an event is perceived depends on the feature’s relevance for the task (Hommel,
2004). Thus, unattended task-irrelevant features might become activated but
will not become part of any binding. In contrast to code integration, the mere
activation of feature codes is assumed to facilitate the processing of events shar-
ing these features. Consequently, the planning of an action and the resulting
integration of feature codes should only cause inhibitory effects on the attempt
to integrate this code in a second representation. It is important to discern that
in our paradigm the direction of the motion was irrelevant to the participants’
task and no short-term memory representation of the perceptual event had to
be created for later recall. We therefore did not expect action-effect blindness
to occur. Instead, our data indicated a facilitation of motion detections shar-
ing features with the intended action. Whether the encoding of visual motions
into a cognitive representation is impaired, as predicted by the Theory of Event
Coding (Hommel et al., 2001), can not be answered at this point and requests
additional investigations of action effects on the accuracy of motion perception.
As recently argued by Fagioli et al. (2007), actions cannot only affect visual
attention in terms of feature-based interferences but also in terms of a bias
towards an entire stimulus dimension, which results in a facilitated processing
of all features defined in this dimension. This notion is supported by studies
that compared the impact of grasping and pointing actions on the ability to
detect a target object among distractors (Bekkering & Neggers, 2002; Hannus
et al., 2005) or to identify deviants in sequences of visual events (Fagioli et al.,
2005). With these paradigms it could be shown that the intention to grasp
selectively enhances the visual discrimination of the grasp-relevant dimensions
size and orientation. Noteworthy, from research on object perception we know
that it is exactly these two stimulus dimensions that are directly associated
with specific types of motor responses (Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Tucker & Ellis,
1998). For example, Ellis and Tucker (2000) demonstrated that the perception
of big and small objects automatically potentiates the related grasping action,
that is, either a response with the whole hand (power grip) or with the thumb
and index finger only (precision grip). Apparently, effects of object affordances
on response execution reflect the same close bidirectional link between object
and action representation as the effects of action planning on object perception
described above.
Taken together, previous studies on the interference between grasping actions
and perception—including the work of Craighero et al. (1999)—focused on the
two perceptual dimensions size and orientation, both crucial for the visuomotor
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transformation process and thus for the selection and programming of reach-
to-grasp movements. The current study demonstrates an action-induced effect
that cannot be explained by the visuomotor association between intrinsic object
properties and selected grip. Rather, we argue that the visual motion priming
originates from the relation between the action goal (i.e., the object manipula-
tion) and the expected visual-action effects (i.e., a rotational motion). We base
our interpretation on the concept of ideomotor action (cf. Greenwald, 1970a;
Stock & Stock, 2004), which basically holds that actions are represented and
planned in terms of their sensory outcome. Action planning is accordingly un-
derstood as a goal-driven process that involves an anticipation of the desired
action effects at a sensory level. Since motor preparation is accompanied by an
activation of sensory information, it can be predicted that motor preparation
affects visual processing. In line with this reasoning, we interpret our results
as an enhanced processing of events that are consistent with the expected ac-
tion outcome. In sum, the motor-visual priming of motion perception supports
the idea that action planning involves an anticipation of sensory consequences
and furthermore suggests that attention is modulated toward changes in the
environment that represent the potential consequences of the intended action.
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Action and Semantic
Processing
Semantic Activation in Action Planning
3 Action and Semantic Processing
Abstract. Four experiments investigated activation of semantic
information in action preparation. Participants either prepared
to grasp and use an object (e.g., to drink from a cup) or to lift a
finger in association with the object’s position following a go/no-
go lexical-decision task. Word stimuli were consistent to the ac-
tion goals of the object use (Experiment 1) or to the finger lifting
(Experiment 2). Movement onset times yielded a double dissoci-
ation of consistency effects between action preparation and word
processing. This effect was also present for semantic categoriza-
tions (Experiment 3), but disappeared when introducing a letter
identification task (Experiment 4). In sum, our findings indicate
that action semantics are activated selectively in accordance with
the specific action intention of an actor.
This chapter is based on: Lindemann, O., Stenneken, P., van
Schie, H. T., & Bekkering, H. (2006). Semantic activation in
action planning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance, 32 (3), 633-643.
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3.1 Introduction
In the area of motor control, many sophisticated models have been developed
during the last couple of decades that specified the parameters of control for
making object-oriented hand movements (Rosenbaum, 1991). However, a long
neglected issue concerns the role of semantic knowledge in the process of action
planning and control (see Creem & Profitt, 2001). That is, we do not only
attune our motor system to the physical properties of a stimulus, but we also
use our knowledge of what to do with an object and how to use it.
Recently, several behavioral and neuroimaging studies demonstrated that the
visual perception of graspable objects and preparing for action are mutually de-
pendent processes. For example, it has been shown that passive observations of
tools evoke neuronal activation in different cortical motor areas (Martin, Wiggs,
Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996; Grafton, Fadiga, Arbib, & Rizzolatti, 1997; Chao
& Martin, 2000) and facilitate motor responses that are consistent with these
objects (Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Ellis & Tucker, 2000). Interestingly, other studies
assume effects of a reversed directionality, that is, they assume effects of action
on perception (e.g., Mu¨sseler & Hommel, 1997; Wohlschla¨ger, 2000; Mu¨sseler,
Steininger, & Wu¨hr, 2001; Creem-Regehr, Gooch, Sahm, & Thompson, 2004).
Several studies, for instance, showed that the planning or preparation of a motor
action is able to facilitate visual processing, such as the detection of a visual
stimulus that is consistent with the intended action (e.g., Craighero, Fadiga,
Rizzolatti, & Umilta‘ 1999; Bekkering & Neggers, 2002; Hannus, Cornelissen,
Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2005).
Despite the increasing evidence of the direct coupling between visual percep-
tion and action in motor control, the underlying mechanisms and representations
are not well understood (see Hommel, Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001
for recent review and theoretical considerations). In particular, not much is
known about the role of semantic knowledge in action planning. Several neu-
ropsychological studies have shown that there are patients with apraxia who
have a selective deficit in object use but spared semantic knowledge about those
objects (e.g., Buxbaum, Schwartz, & Carew, 1997; Rumiati, Zanini, Vorano, &
Shallice, 2001). On the other hand, patients have been reported with seman-
tic loss but with the ability to manipulate objects accordingly (e.g., Buxbaum
et al., 1997; Lauro-Grotto, Piccini, & Shallice, 1997). This indicates that the
two domains, action planning and semantic knowledge, are at some level inde-
pendent from each other and that the accessibility of conceptual knowledge is
not necessarily required for an appropriate object-directed action. Comparable
findings led Riddoch, Humphreys, and Price (1989) to conclude that there is a
direct route from vision to action that bypasses semantics. This notion received
additional support from experiments with neuropsychological intact adults (Ru-
miati & Humphreys, 1998). Interestingly, however, a recent study by Creem and
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Proffitt (2001) indicated that action planning and semantic processing cannot be
considered under all circumstances as two independent processes. They found
in a dual-task experiment that normal subjects often used inappropriate grasp-
ing for household tools when object grasping was paired with a semantic dual
task, but less so when paired with a visuospatial dual task. As the authors ar-
gued, this finding indicates that semantic processing is involved when preparing
to grasp a meaningful object. The notion of the important role of functional
knowledge in object-directed motor action is also supported by behavioral and
developmental studies in children and adults indicating that in our everyday
life, we build up strong associations between objects and hand shapes (Klatzky,
Pellegrino, McCloskey, & Doherty, 1989; Klatzky, Pellegrino, McCloskey, & Le-
derman, 1993) and the purpose or function for which objects are typically used
(Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976; McGregor, Friedman,
Reilly, & Newman, 2002).
The importance of semantics for action is furthermore reflected by the re-
sults of behavioral studies that showed that semantic properties of distracting
words (Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani, Daprati, & Gangitano, 2000; Gentilucci
& Gangitano, 1998; Glover & Dixon, 2002; Glover, Rosenbaum, Graham, &
Dixon, 2004) or objects (Jervis, Bennett, Thomas, Lim, & Castiello, 1999) in-
fluenced the kinematics of reach-to-grasp movements. For instance, Gentilucci
et al. (2000) reported that Italian words denoting far and near printed on
to-be-grasped objects had comparable effects on movement kinematics as the
actual greater or shorter distances between hand position and object. Glover
and Dixon (2002) reported that maximum grip aperture was enlarged when
subjects grasped an object with the word large printed on top, as compared to
grasping of an object with label small. Another effect indicating an interaction
between semantics and action was reported by Glenberg and Kaschak (2002).
They instructed their participants to judge whether sentences were sensible by
making a motor response that required moving toward or away from their bod-
ies and found faster response latencies when the sentence implied an action in
same direction (e.g., “Close the drawer”, which implies an action away from the
body) as the direction of the required motor response (e.g., moving their hand
away from their body to indicate “yes”). According to the authors, this directly
supports the notion that language comprehension is grounded in bodily actions.
The studies previously mentioned nicely demonstrate the impact of semantic
information on the action system, showing the readiness in which semantic con-
tent, for example, from words, may interfere with and influence ongoing behav-
ioral performance. It is typically not the case that mere activation of semantic
information will in itself result in the execution of a stereotypical action, how-
ever (with the exception of patients that display utilization behavior; Archibald,
Mateer, & Kerns, 2001). Rather, human behavior, in unaffected cases, shows
the ability to withstand many of the automatic tendencies or affordances that
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may be present in the environment and to control action selection in accordance
with immediate and long-term behavioral goals (Norman & Shallice, 1986; see
Humphreys & Riddoch, 2000; Rumiati et al., 2001 for neuropsychological cases
in which there is a deficit in supervisory attentional control).
Although it is clear that executive processes that regulate the coherence of
goal-directed behavior over time, must at some point, modulate the influence of
action semantics on behavior, the exact interaction between the two mechanisms
remains to be determined. One possibility is that semantic information on
the functional use of objects is activated automatically upon presentation of
those objects and that the control mechanisms for action subsequently select
the most favorable course of action from the available alternatives (Buxbaum,
2001). Another possibility is that the activation of semantic information is
selectively modulated in accordance with the behavioral goals of the task that
the person is involved in. In this case, the semantic properties of the object
will not be activated in full, but only those aspects that are relevant for the
ongoing task. This hypothesis would be consistent with a selection-for-action
viewpoint (Allport, 1987) in which information, whether perceptual or semantic,
is selected in accordance with the action intention of the person that is about to
act. In partial support for this possibility, electrophysiological studies indicate
that providing subjects with specific task instructions to attend and respond to
certain object properties, determines the type of semantic information that is
activated to those objects (Coltheart, Inglis, Cupples, Michie, Bates, & Budd,
1998).
Whereas interactions between perception and action have been studied in
both directions (effects of perception on action and influence of action prepa-
ration on perception; see information previously mentioned), there have been
hardly any studies that looked into the influence of action preparation on the
level of semantics. In the present study, we attempt to learn more about the
activation of semantic information in the course of action preparation and tested
the hypothesis that semantic action knowledge is activated in accordance with
the specific action intention of the actor.
Traditionally, language tasks have been used to investigate semantics. A
typical finding is that the semantic context (e.g., provided by a prime word)
facilitates the processing of semantically related words (for review, see Neely,
1991). Priming effects have often been studied with a lexical-decision task in
which participants have to judge whether a visually presented letter string is a
lexically valid word or not. The semantic priming effect is very robust and has
been supposed to occur automatically (Neely, 1991). It is plausible to assume
that semantic preactivation is not restricted to the linguistic domain (e.g., from
prime word to target word). Semantic effects have been reliably found between
linguistic and nonlinguistic stimuli (e.g., Lucas, 2000; Van Schie, Wijers, Kellen-
bach, & Stowe, 2003). Additionally, priming studies have indicated facilitation
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for a variety of prime-target relations, including script relations, functional re-
lations, and perceptual relations (overview in Lucas, 2000).
To investigate effects of action preparation on semantics, four experiments
were conducted in which the preparation of an action provided the semantic
context for a subsequently presented word. In all experiments, participants
prepared a motor action (e.g., drink from a cup) and delayed its execution un-
til a word appeared on a screen. In Experiment 1, participants were required
to execute the action (go) if the word was lexically valid, but withhold from
responding if a pseudoword was presented (no-go). The size of interference be-
tween action preparation and lexical decision was estimated by comparing the
movement onset times in trials with action-consistent words (e.g., mouth) and
action inconsistent words (e.g., eye). To ensure that the expected action word-
processing interaction depended on the relation between prepared action and
processed words and not on the sequence of the presented stimuli (i.e., picture-
word priming, cf. Vanderwart, 1984; Bajo & Canas, 1989), a control condition
was introduced in which participants were required to perform simple finger-
lifting movements instead of grasping responses. Assuming that the semantic
concepts associated with the goal location of the object use are only activated
with the preparation to grasp the objects, interactions between action planning
and word processing were only expected in the grasping condition. The prepa-
ration of finger-lifting responses, however, should not activate these semantic
concepts.
3.2 Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate the activation of action semantics
in association with action preparation. We required our subjects either to grasp
and use one of two objects (cup or magnifying glass) or to lift one of two fingers
related to the object positions. Subsequently presented words in a go/no-go
lexical decision task (Gordon, 1983) determined whether the prepared motor
action should be executed (go) or not (no-go). In line with the hypothesis that
action semantics are activated conform the action intention of the subjects, we
expected faster responses in the object grasping condition for trials, in which
words were consistent with the goal location of the object use, as compared
to trials with inconsistent words. In contrast, no latency differences between
consistent and inconsistent words were expected for finger lifting responses.
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the ex-
perimental setup. A cup (Ob-
ject 1), a magnifying glass (Ob-
ject 2) and a computer display
were placed on the table. Partic-
ipants placed their right hand on
the starting position.
3.2.1 Method
Participants
Twenty-four students (18 females and 6 males) from the University of Nijmegen
took part in the experiment. All were right-handed and Dutch native speakers.
Setup
Figure 3.1 illustrates the experimental setup. In front of the participants, we
placed a computer display and a touch sensitive response box with markers to
indicate and control the starting position of the right hand. Additionally, a
cylindrical cup without any handle (diameter 7.5 cm, height 10.0 cm) and a
round magnifying glass (diameter 7.5 cm) with a handgrip (length 9.0 cm) were
situated on the table, both at a reaching distance of 33 cm. To keep the object
positions constant we used a desk pad with drawings of the object contours.
The object positions (left side/right side) were counterbalanced between the
participants.
Procedure
All participants were randomly assigned to one of two action conditions (object
grasping or finger-lifting). At the beginning of each trial, a picture of one of the
two objects appeared on the screen for 500 ms. In the object-grasping condition,
participants were instructed to prepare actions associated with these objects.
None of these actions was described verbally, nor were actions or their endpoints
mentioned in the task instructions. Instead, the experimenter performed the
associated actions in presence of the subject to instruct the required motor
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responses at the beginning of the experiment. For example, if a cup was shown,
the required action was to grasp the cup and to bring it to the mouth. The motor
response associated with the magnifying glass was to grasp the object and move
it to the right eye. By contrast, in the finger-lifting condition, the participants
prepared a lifting of either the index or middle finger of the right hand depending
on which side the depicted object was situated on the table. Importantly, the
action in association with the object had to be delayed until the presentation
of a word on the screen. After a variable delay of 500 ms to 2,000 ms either a
valid Dutch word or a pseudoword was presented for 1,000 ms. We instructed
our subjects to initiate the prepared action as soon as the word was identified
as a lexically valid word (go), and to place back the object after the action was
finished. Whenever a pseudoword was displayed, participants were instructed
to withhold from responding (no-go). In the object-grasping condition, a cross
appeared on the screen 2,500 ms after word offset and extinguished when the
subject returned the hand correctly to the starting position. Because the time
needed to execute a simple finger movement is relatively short, the cross in the
finger-lifting condition was presented 1,000 ms after word offset.
Stimuli and design
The target words used for the go/no-go lexical decision task were the Dutch
words MOND [mouth] and OOG [eye] representing the goal locations of the
action associated with the cup and the action associated with the magnifying
glass, respectively. In addition, two unrelated filler words, DEUR [door] and
TAS [bag], were selected to match the target words with respect to word cat-
egory, word length (three or four letters, monosyllabic) and word frequency in
written Dutch language (CELEX lexical database, Burnage, 1990). Thus, in go
trials, the presented words were either consistent with respect to the prepared
action, inconsistent with the action (that is, associated with the other object),
or unrelated fillers. Additionally, five legal pseudo-words were constructed for
the no-go trials. These were derived from the targets by replacing all letters
(vowels by vowels and consonants by consonants) so that the syllable structure
and the word length were identical to those of targets. All pseudo-words obeyed
the Dutch phonotactics.
Thus, there were two action conditions (object grasping and finger lifting)
varied between subjects. Each condition consisted of 96 target trials (50% ac-
tion consistent words, 50% action inconsistent words), 48 filler trials, and 30
(17.2%) no-go trials (2 objects × 5 pseudo-words × 3 repetitions). All trials
were presented in a randomized sequence. The experiment lasted about 30 min-
utes.
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Data acquisition and analysis
To record hand and finger movements we used an electromagnetic position track-
ing system (miniBIRD 800TM , Ascension Technology Corporation). In the ob-
ject grasping condition, three sensors were attached to the participants’ thumb,
index finger, and wrist of their right hand. Only two sensors, one attached to
the right index finger and one to the middle finger, were needed in the finger
lifting condition. Sensor positions were tracked with a sampling rate of 103.3
Hz.
Movement kinematics were analyzed off-line. We applied a fourth-order But-
terworth lowpass filter with a cut-off frequency of 10 Hz on the raw data. Two
criteria were chosen to detect onsets and offsets of the reach-to-grasp and finger
lifting movements. An onset was defined to be the first moment in time when
the tangential velocity exceeded the threshold of 10 cm/s and remained above
this level for the minimum duration of 400 ms (object grasping condition) or 50
ms (finger lifting condition). For the offsets, we used the reversed criteria, taking
the time of the first sample where the velocity decreased below the threshold
for the predefined time.
The time differences between word onset and hand movement onset (deter-
mined by the wrist sensor) were used to calculate response latencies in the object
grasping condition. We additionally calculated the following kinematic param-
eters of the first movement after word presentation: reach time, peak velocity,
and percentage of time to maximum grip aperture with respect to reach time
(TMG). In the finger lifting condition the analysis was restricted to the response
latencies determined by the onset of the first finger movement after word pre-
sentation. All trials with incorrect response (i.e., incorrect lexical decisions and
wrong actions) or with response latencies more than 1.5 standard deviations
from each participant’s mean were excluded from the statistical analysis (cf.
Ratcliff, 1993).
A type I error rate of α = .05 was used in all statistical tests reported in this
chapter. Given α = .05 and n = 12 participants in both action conditions,
contrasts between consistent and inconsistent trials of the size d′
3
= .9 (cf.
Cohen, 1977) could be detected with a probability of (1 − β) = .81 for object
grasping as well as for finger lifting1.
3.2.2 Results
For both action conditions, the percentages of correct lexical decisions to Dutch
words (hits) were greater than 98.4%. No false alarm responses occurred. Wrong
1All statistical power analyses reported here were performed using the G*Power 2 program
(Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996)
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Figure 3.2: Mean response latencies in the go/no-go lexical decision task of Experiment 1
(goal locations) and 2 (spatial descriptions) as a function of the factors action condition and
word consistency. Error bars represent the 95% within-subject confidence intervals (cf. Loftus
& Masson, 1996).
actions (i.e., lifting the wrong finger or grasping the wrong object) occurred in
less than 1% of all hit trials.
The response latencies to target words (i.e., consistent and inconsistent words)
and filler words did not differ significantly, neither for object grasping, t(11) =
−2.00, p > .05 nor for finger lifting, |t(11)| < 1. For further analyses we focused
on the contrast between consistent and inconsistent trials.
The mean response latencies to target words in the lexical decision task are
shown in Figure 3.2. A mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) with one
between-subject factor (action condition: object grasping or finger lifting) and
one within-subject factor (word consistency) was computed. The data showed
an overall trend for the factor word consistency, F (1, 22) = 3.91, p = .06. Most
important, the interaction between the two factors was significant, F (1, 22) =
4.72, p < .05. Post-hoc 2-tailed t-tests showed that for object grasping the
latencies to consistent words (521 ms) were shorter than to inconsistent words
(538 ms), t(11) = −3.35, p < .01, d′
3
= 1.36 (cf. Cohen, 1977), whereas no
significant difference was observed in the finger lifting condition (consistent:
493 ms vs. inconsistent: 492 ms), |t(11)| < 1.
For the object grasping condition, we calculated the kinematic parameters
reach time, peak velocity and the percentage of time to maximum grip aper-
ture (TMG). They were entered separately into three 2 (object) × 2 (word
consistency) repeated measures ANOVAs (see Table 3.1). When grasping the
cup, peak velocity was slower, F (1, 11) = 12.58, p < .01, and TMG was later,
F (1, 11) = 15.04, p < .01, as compared to trials in which the magnifying glass
was grasped. The reach times didn’t differ significantly. More important, no
effects of the word consistency were found in any kinematic variable, all F < 1.
46
3.3 Experiment 2
Table 3.1: Means of the Kinematic Parameters Reach Time (RET), Peak Velocity (PV),
and Percentage of Time to Maximum Grip Aperture with Respect to Reach Time (TMG) in
Experiment 1 as a Function of the Word Consistency.
Cup Magnifying Glass
Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
RET (ms) 592 597 585 582
PV (cm/s) 123.9 123.4 137.1 137.7
TMG (%) 76.5 75.8 51.8 50.6
3.2.3 Discussion
In summary, response latencies to words consistent with the action goal of the
movements were faster if object grasping was prepared. On the contrary, no
consistency effects were found when subjects prepared for finger lifting. This
dissociation suggests that the action word-processing interaction did not merely
arise from presenting the object pictures or from attention being selectively di-
rected to one of the two objects. Both action conditions were identical in these
aspects. We can also exclude the alternative explanation that simple picture-
word priming (cf. Vanderwart, 1984; Bajo & Canas, 1989) caused the response
latency differences, because pictures and words were identical in both condi-
tions. Rather, the results suggest that action-specific semantic information was
selected in association with the action goal of the movement that was prepared.
Only when subjects had the intention to grasp and use the objects, a relative
advantage was found for words that specified the goal location of the object
use. Furthermore, the absence of priming effects in the finger-lifting condition
argues against the hypothesis that action semantics are activated automatically
and independent from the behavioral goal upon the presentation of objects.
Nevertheless, there is a possible alternative account for the lack of response
latency differences in the finger-lifting condition. In Experiment 1, the prepa-
ration of simple finger movements appears much easier than the preparation
of reach-to-grasp movements, which are motorically more complex. As a con-
sequence, participants may have been more efficient in cognitively separating
action preparation and word recognition tasks, resulting in the absence of an
action word-processing interaction for the finger-lifting condition.
3.3 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was conducted to exclude the possibility that the differences in the
motor complexity in the two action conditions (object grasping and finger lifting)
may have affected interactions between action preparation and lexical decision.
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In order to test that the effects reported in Experiment 1 were independent
of movement complexity and the result of an interaction between the semantic
representations involved in motor preparation and word processing, we sought
to reverse the pattern of effects between the two conditions. Instead of using
words related to the goal locations of grasping movements, we presented the
Dutch words for left and right, as representatives of action features believed to
be important in the finger-lifting condition. We hypothesized that these spatial
descriptions were much more relevant for the finger-lifting condition than for
the object-grasping condition. In other words, we predicted an action word-
processing interaction primarily for the finger-lifting condition and much smaller
or no effects for object grasping.
3.3.1 Method
Participants
Again, twenty-four students (16 females and 8 males) from the University of
Nijmegen were tested. All were right-handed and Dutch native speakers.
Setup and procedure
The experimental setup and procedure was the same as compared to Experi-
ment 1.
Stimuli and design
For the go/no-go lexical decision task we used as consistent and inconsistent
words (target words) the Dutch words for the spatial relations left and right
(i.e., LINKS and RECHTS ). The unrelated filler words were BLAUW [blue]
and SCHOON [nice, clean], selected to match target words in word category,
word length (i.e. number of letters and syllables) and word frequency in written
Dutch language. For the no-go trials, five legal pseudo-words with the same
word lengths and syllable structure as the target words were constructed from
the targets by replacing all letters. The experimental design was identical to
Experiment 1.
Data acquisition and analysis
Data acquisition and analysis was unchanged. Also, the statistical power to
detected consistency effects was identical to those in Experiment 1.
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Table 3.2: Means of the Kinematic Parameters Reach Time (RET), Peak Velocity (PV),
and Percentage of Time to Maximum Grip Aperture with Respect to Reach Time (TMG) in
Experiment 2 as a Function of the Word Consistency.
Cup Magnifying Glass
Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
RET (ms) 628 635 637 638
PV (cm/s) 128.6 127.6 141.2 143.0
TMG (%) 77.7 78.5 41.0 38.7
3.3.2 Results
Hit rates for both action conditions were higher than 98.8%. No false alarm
responses occurred. The percentages of wrong actions were 2.8% for object
grasping and 0.8% for finger lifting. In both action conditions, response latencies
to filler words were statistically not different from the latencies to target words,
both |t(11)| < 1.
Mean response latencies to target words in the lexical decision task are shown
in Figure 3.2 on page 46. The 2 (action condition)× 2 (word consistency) mixed-
model ANOVA yielded no main effects. Again, a significant interaction between
word consistency and action condition was found, F (1, 22) = 10.48, p < .001.
Interestingly, in the finger lifting condition response latencies to inconsistent
words (524 ms) were longer than to consistent words (504 ms), t(11) = 2.82,
p < .05, d′
3
= 1.15. However, no significant differences were found in the object
grasping condition (consistent: 520 ms vs. inconsistent: 514 ms), t(11) = 1.58,
p > .05.
The three two-factorial repeated measures ANOVAs (object × word consis-
tency) of the kinematic parameters revealed that grasping the cup led to slower
peak velocities, F (1, 11) = 8.43, p < .05, and later TMG, F (1, 11) = 30.02,
p < .001 (see Table 3.2). However, there was no influence of the word consis-
tency on any kinematic variable, all F (1, 11) < 1.
3.3.3 Discussion
In summary, consistent with the results of the previous experiment, Experi-
ment 2 showed an action word-processing interaction using the spatial descrip-
tions left and right. Again, no effect of the word consistency was found in
the analysis of kinematics. Importantly, however, in contrast to the first ex-
periment, consistency effects were now present in the finger-lifting condition,
whereas the response latencies in the object-grasping condition were unaffected
by the word meaning. Overall, there is a double dissociation of effects between
Experiment 1 and 2, which indicates that the action word-processing interac-
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tion cannot be explained by the complexity of the motor response. Rather, the
results of Experiment 1 and 2 are consistent with the hypothesis that action
semantics were specifically activated in association with the action intended by
the subject.
Although it is difficult to imagine an explanation for the action word-pro-
cessing interaction without including semantics, there is a possibility that the
repeated use of the same words in the experiment may have led participants to
perform the lexical-decision task on the basis of the visual word forms alone,
without involving semantics. To control for this possibility and to provide fur-
ther support for the idea that the interaction between action preparation and
word processing critically depends on semantic processing, two additional ex-
periments were performed, in which we introduced a semantic categorization
and a letter identification task.
3.4 Experiment 3
In order to better understand the nature of the action word-processing interac-
tion, we introduced a semantic categorization task instead of a lexical-decision
task for the current experiment. We cannot exclude the possibility that the
participants in the first two experiments did read the words, but relied only on
the visual word forms and did not process words to a semantic level. Clearly, a
semantic categorization task cannot be performed without deep semantic pro-
cessing. Thus, Experiment 3 allows collecting further evidence for the assump-
tion that the relevant processing level for the action word-processing interaction
is the semantic processing level.
3.4.1 Method
Participants
Fifteen students (13 females and 2 males) from the University of Nijmegen
participated in Experiment 3 in return for 4 Euros or course credits. All were
right-handed and Dutch native speakers.
Setup and procedure
The experimental setup was the same as in Experiment 1. Only, instead of using
a touch sensitive response box, we implemented an online control function in the
motion tracking software to control whether the hand was positioned correctly
at the beginning of each trial. A white and tangible circle (3 cm) on the desk
pad served as marker for the initial position.
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Table 3.3: Word Stimuli Used in Experiment 3 (Semantic Categorization Task, SC Task)
and Experiment 4 (Final Letter Identification Task, FLI Task).
Stimulus Category
Word Stimulus
(Dutch)
English
Translation
Experiment 3
(SC Task)
Experiment 4
(FLI Task)
mond mouth target target
oog eye target target
heup hip filler no-go
rug back filler filler
nek nape filler no-go
buik stomach filler no-go
mug mosquito no-go filler
mier ant no-go no-go
eend duck no-go filler
kat cat no-go no-go
vis fish no-go no-go
hond dog no-go filler
The procedure was basically identical to Experiment 1. That is, each trial
started with a picture of one of the objects, which indicated the action to pre-
pare. After a variable delay a word appeared, which triggered the action initia-
tion. In contrast to the previous experiments, a semantic categorization task was
used for the go/no-go decisions. Participants were instructed to decide whether
the displayed word represents a human body part or an animal. In the case of
a body part the prepared action had to be initiated immediately; in the case
of an animal no response was required. The semantic categorizations had to be
performed as fast and accurate as possible. Since the aim of this experiment was
to replicate the action word-processing interaction in object grasping, we could
refrain from varying the type of action. Thus, all participants were required to
prepare and execute reach-to-grasp movements to use the objects.
Materials
The twelve Dutch words that were used for the semantic categorization task are
printed in Table 3.3. As in Experiment 1, the words MOND [mouth] and OOG
[eye] were the target words, which were consistent or inconsistent with respect
to the goal location of the prepared action. Additionally, we used four action
unrelated words, all members of the natural category of the human body as filler
words and six members of the natural category of animals as no-go stimuli.
Both categories were part of the supracategory natural and were chosen so that
they were roughly comparable in category size. All words were selected to
match the two target words with respect to word length (3 or 4 of letters and
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Figure 3.3: Mean response latencies in Ex-
periment 3 (semantic categorization task)
and in Experiment 4 (final letter identifica-
tion task) as a function of the factors action
condition and word consistency. Error bars
represent the 95% within-subject confidence
intervals (cf. Loftus & Masson, 1996).
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monosyllabic), word category and word frequency in written Dutch language
(cf. CELEX lexical database, Burnage, 1990). Both target words were repeated
20 times in combination with each of the two object pictures indicating the
respective action. In order to obtain an equal amount of trials with target
words and filler words, the four fillers were presented ten times per object. All
six no-go stimuli were repeated four times per object.
The experiment consisted of 80 target trials (50% action consistent words,
50% action inconsistent words), 80 filler trials and 48 (23.0%) no-go trials. All
trials were presented in a randomized sequence. The experiment lasted about
40 minutes.
Data acquisition and analysis
Data acquisition and analyses of latencies and kinematics were as described in
Experiment 1. Given α = .05 and n = 15 participants, consistency effects of
size d′
3
= .8 could be detected with a probability of (1− β) = .82.
3.4.2 Results
The percentage of correctly categorized body-parts (hits) was 98.2%. Incorrect
categorizations of animals (false alarms) occurred in average in less than 1%
of all trials. Incorrect actions were observed in less than 1% of the hit trials.
Response latencies to action-unrelated filler words (499 ms) were slower than to
target words (482 ms), t(14) = −6.10, p < .001. This difference is not surprising,
because filler words were presented less frequently than target stimuli.
Mean response latencies to consistent and inconsistent target words for the
semantic categorization task are shown in Figure 3.3. As expected, the responses
to action-consistent words (474 ms) were significantly faster as compared to
action-inconsistent words (490 ms), t(14) = 2.37, p < .05, d′
3
= 0.87.
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Table 3.4: Means of the Kinematic Parameters Reach Time (RET), Peak Velocity (PV),
and Percentage of Time to Maximum Grip Aperture with Respect to Reach Time (TMG) in
Experiment 3 as a Function of the Word Consistency.
Cup Magnifying Glass
Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
RET (ms) 522.1 522.0 517.2 515.8
PV (cm/s) 117.6 117.1 125.7 125.1
TMG (%) 76.1 76.5 71.8 71.9
The 2 (object) × 2 (word consistency) repeated measures ANOVAs of the
reach time, peak velocity, and percentage of time to maximum grip aperture
(TMG) yielded no influence of word meaning on any kinematic variable, all
F (1, 15) < 1 (see Table 3.4). Merely effects of the objects were present, that
is, grasping the cup led to slower peak velocities, F (1, 15) = 7.97, p < .05, and
later TMG, F (1, 15) = 5.72, p < .05.
3.4.3 Discussion
The aim of the present experiment was to provide further evidence for a seman-
tic nature of the action word-processing interaction observed in Experiment 1.
Unambiguously, the categorization task in the present experiment required deep
semantic processing and the low number of errors in this task indicates that se-
mantic processing was indeed successfully performed by the participants. Sim-
ilar to the results of Experiment 1 response latencies were faster for conditions
in which the word semantics were consistent with the prepared action, without
there being any effects in movement kinematics. The results of Experiment 3
indicate the reliability of the action word-processing interaction and support our
assumption that the effect reflects an interaction at a semantic level.
Still, one additional test may be applied to strengthen the present conclu-
sions. If the interaction between action preparation and word processing indeed
critically depends on semantic processing, the effect should disappear under
conditions where the activation of word semantics is not required to solve the
task.
3.5 Experiment 4
Previous studies using a word-to-word priming paradigm have shown that the se-
mantic priming effect is reduced or eliminated when participants perform a letter
identification task on the prime word (prime-task effect, e.g., Henik, Friedrich,
Tzelgov, & Tramer, 1994; Stolz & Besner, 1996). Similarly, Stroop interference
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can be reduced or eliminated when only a single letter is colored instead of the
whole word, as in the standard version of the task (Besner, Stolz, & Boutilier,
1997). In both tasks, allocating attention to low-level features of the word is
assumed to hinder semantic processing.
In the present experiment, we transferred this logic to the paradigm involving
action preparation and word reading. We used the same experimental proce-
dure and the identical stimulus set as in Experiment 3, although, the go/no-go
criterion was whether a given letter was present in the final position of the
word form. If the observed consistency effects require semantic processing, the
response latency differences should disappear or become significantly smaller
using a low-level letter-identification task.
3.5.1 Method
Participants
Twenty right-handed and Dutch native speaking students (14 females and 6
males) from the University of Nijmegen were tested.
Procedure
The experimental setup and procedure was identical to Experiment 3. The only
modification was that the go/no-go decisions were based on the final letter of the
word that was presented. To be precise, participants were instructed to initiate
the prepared action as soon as possible only if the word ended with either the
letter “D” or “G”, and not to respond if the word ended with any other letter.
Materials
The same twelve Dutch words as in Experiment 3 were used for the letter identi-
fication (see Table 3.3 on page 51). Again, the two goal locations of the actions
MOND [mouth] and OOG [eye] served as target words. Four action unrelated
words (filler words) also ended with a “D” or a “G” and served as go stimuli.
The remaining six words, which did not end with “D” or “G” served as no-go
stimuli. The frequencies of presentation of targets, fillers, and no-go stimuli were
the same as described in Experiment 3. Thus, there were 80 target trials (50%
action consistent words, 50% action inconsistent words), 80 filler trials and 48
(23.0%) no-go trials. All trials were presented in a randomized sequence. The
experiment lasted about 40 minutes.
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Table 3.5: Means of the Kinematic Parameters Reach Time (RET), Peak Velocity (PV),
and Percentage of Time to Maximum Grip Aperture with Respect to Reach Time (TMG) in
Experiment 4 as a Function of the Word Consistency.
Cup Magnifying Glass
Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
RET (ms) 508.0 508.3 527.2 523.9
PV (cm/s) 118.8 118.6 123.5 125.9
TMG (%) 70.1 70.7 59.8 59.6
Data acquisition and analysis
Data acquisition and analyses of latencies and kinematics were as described
in Experiment 1. In order to interpret a potential non-significant result, as
hypothesized, an a priori power analysis was performed. Given α = .05 and
(1−β) = .80, n = 20 participants were needed to detect a consistency effect with
somewhat smaller size (d′
3
= .7) than the effects in the first three experiments.
3.5.2 Results
The percentage of correct identifications of the final letter “D” and “G” (hits)
was greater than 98%. False alarms occurred in less than 1% of all trials, wrong
action in less than 1% of the hit trials. Response latencies to filler words (475
ms) were longer than to targets words (459 ms), t(19) = 5.33, p < .001, which
reflects the fact that filler words were presented less often than target words.
Mean response latencies to target words for the final letter identification task
are shown in Figure 3.3 on page 52. Importantly, there was no statistical differ-
ence between the response latencies to consistent words (457 ms) as compared
to inconsistent words (462 ms), t(19) = 1.29.
Again, the three kinematic parameters were analyzed with separate 2 (object)
× 2 (word consistency) ANOVAs (see Table 3.5). Grasping of the cup led to
later TMG, F (1, 19) = 6.80, p < .05. No effects were observed in peak velocities
and reach times. As in the three experiments before, we did not find effects of
the word meaning on any kinematic variable, all F (1, 19) < 1.4.
3.5.3 Discussion
In summary, no reliable action word-processing interaction was observed with
the letter identification task. There were no significant differences in response
latencies for action-consistent words as compared to inconsistent words. Because
the statistical power was satisfactory, we can exclude the presence of an inter-
action between action intention and word semantics in the present experiment.
These results are in line with our assumption that when semantic processing is
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not required for the go/no-go task, no action word-processing interaction can be
observed. Although some degree of automatic semantic processing of word forms
cannot be excluded in the letter identification task, when attention was directed
to low-level features of the target words, the interaction effects disappeared. Ac-
cordingly, the activation of semantic representations from the visual word form
seems to be a prerequisite for the observed interaction, which emphasizes the
semantic nature of the action word-processing interaction effect.
3.6 General Discussion
The results of the present study demonstrate an interaction effect between pro-
cesses involved in action preparation and processes involved in word reading.
Response latencies were sped up if words presented in a go/no-go decision task
were consistent with the features of a concurrently prepared action. In Experi-
ment 1, when subjects prepared to grasp the objects, reaction times were faster
when words consistently described the goal location (i.e., mouth or cup) of the
prepared action. When subjects prepared finger-lifting movements on the basis
of the object positions instead of performing object-directed actions, however,
reaction time effects were found to disappear. These results suggest that func-
tional semantic information regarding the purpose or action goal for which an
object is typically used does not become activated automatically upon presen-
tation of the object, but only when subjects intend to use the object with that
specific purpose.
Experiment 2 further supported the hypothesis that semantics are activated
in association with the action intention of the actor and ruled out possible al-
ternative explanations for the difference between the two action conditions in
Experiment 1. Changing the words to describe relevant action features for the
finger-lifting condition (left and right) resulted in an action word-processing in-
teraction for this condition, whereas no effect was found in the condition in which
subjects grasped and used objects. Both the dissociations between conditions
within each experiment and the reversal of effects between experiments are con-
sistent with our hypothesis that action semantics about objects are selectively
activated and depend on the actor’s intention.
Experiments 3 and 4 further supported the suggestion that the action word-
processing interaction critically depends on the depth of semantic processing
required by the go/no-go task. In Experiment 3, in which subjects made se-
mantic decisions about word category instead of the lexical decisions, the action
word-processing interaction between the two tasks was found unchanged. As
Experiment 4 demonstrates, however, the mere presentation of a visual word
form is obviously not sufficient to cause this effect, which indicates the semantic
nature of this effect. Therefore, we consider the use of a secondary language
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task as a successful approach to investigate semantic action representations and
the use of functional object knowledge in the context of action preparation.
In line with the results of Experiments 3 and 4, which show that the activa-
tion of semantic concepts was critically involved in establishing the interaction
between the two tasks, contemporary models of motor control (Rosenbaum,
Meulenbroek, Vaughan, & Jansen, 2001; Glover, 2004) suggest that conceptual
knowledge is involved in the selection of appropriate action plans. Consistent
with this notion, recent experiments in the field of motor control demonstrated
that presentation of irrelevant semantic information (via words) has a direct
impact on movement kinematics of reach-to-grasp actions (Gentilucci & Gangi-
tano, 1998; Gentilucci et al., 2000; Glover & Dixon, 2002; Glover, 2004). For
example, Glover and Dixon (2002) reported that maximum grip aperture was
enlarged while grasping an object with the word label large as compared to
grasping an object with the word label small. Interestingly, Glover et al., (2004)
reported an automatic effect of word reading on grasp aperture using words
for objects that either afford a large grip (e.g., apple) or a small grip (e.g.,
grape). In both studies, Glover and colleagues performed a detailed analysis of
the movement kinematics, which showed that word semantics affected the motor
action only very early in the movement. As the hand approached the target,
the impact of word semantics was found to decline continuously. In line with
these results, the authors concluded that semantic information interferes only
with motor planning but not with motor control once the action is initiated.
This view is consistent with the present findings in which word meaning only
affected reaction times but not the online control of movement execution. Con-
cerning the absence of kinematic effects, our study notably differs from earlier
studies on semantics in motor action. To be precise, in our paradigm, it was
required to prepare the action before word onset and to execute it after word
processing. In other words, motor action and word reading did not take place
at the same time. This may explain the absence of kinematics effects in the
present study and suggests that the reaction time differences reflect effects in
the word-processing performances caused by action preparation.
Although the absence of kinematic effects is consistent with the assumption
that actions were prepared effectively, an alternative account that may partly
explain our results is that, instead of preparing a motor response, participants
represented the upcoming motor task verbally in short-term memory and re-
called these verbal descriptions for the grasping or finger-lifting actions after
picture onset. It must be emphasized, however, that in the present study, sub-
jects were never instructed in words such as “grasp the left object and bring
it to the mouth.” Instead, subjects just saw the relevant actions once before
the experiment started. Furthermore, the short reaction times, minimal error
rates, and absence of kinematic effects in all experiments indicate that subjects
prepared the upcoming actions well before word onset and do not suggest that
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participants memorized the motor task verbally and prepared the action only
after word onset. This assumption is also supported by several studies on motor
control (e.g., Rosenbaum, 1983; Leuthold, Sommer, & Ulrich, 2004), which in-
dicate that, in delayed response conditions, subjects tend to prepare the motor
response as far as possible in advance instead of maintaining cueing information
in memory or recalling the task instruction. In light of these arguments, we con-
sider the verbal working memory explanation to be unlikely, and we favor the
interpretation that effects reflect semantic overlap between action preparation
and lexical semantics.
Hommel and Mu¨sseler (2006) recently investigated the effects of action prepa-
ration on the perception of directional words (i.e., left and right). They required
their participants to prepare either a manual left-right keypress response or to
say “left” or “right.” Later, they briefly presented a directional word. In con-
trast to the present paradigm, the words had to be recalled after executing the
prepared response. Under these conditions, planning vocal actions impaired
the perception of directional words, but, interestingly, the preparation of man-
ual responses did not affect word processing. Although it might be difficult to
compare accuracy effects in an unspeeded identification task with reaction time
effects in a lexical-decision task, these results seem to be in contradiction with
the results of the present study. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is
that in the study of Hommel and Mu¨sseler (2006), participants were required to
maintain a short-term memory representation of the presented words, which was
not the case in the present study. According to the feature-integration approach
(Stoet & Hommel, 1999; Hommel, 2004), attending a perceptual object as well
as planning an action implies an integration of several activated feature codes
into one coherent object representation or action plan. The mere activation of
feature codes should facilitate processing of all events sharing these features.
Once a feature code is integrated into an action plan or object representation,
however, it is no longer available for another integration if needed for other cog-
nitive processes. As a result, this process is assumed to be impaired. It has been
suggested that the likelihood that a feature code becomes integrated depends on
the relevance of the respective feature for the task. That is, unattended or task-
irrelevant features may become activated but not integrated into one or more
bindings (Hommel, 2004). In line of this reasoning, in the study of Hommel
and Mu¨sseler (2006, Experiment 3A), feature integration of the word semantics
was required to maintain a short-term memory representation. In the present
study, however, semantic features were activated but were not integrated into
a short-term memory representation, which had to be maintained while acting.
Consequently, we found that the semantic congruency between the two tasks
did not result in an inhibitory effect, but in a facilitation of word processing.
Several studies have shown that action preparation as well as action execution
can influence visual perception (Craighero et al., 1999; Mu¨sseler & Hommel,
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1997; Mu¨sseler et al., 2001; Wohlschla¨ger, 2000). For example, Craighero et al.
(1999) required their participants to prepare an action (i.e., to grasp a bar with
a specific orientation) but to delay action execution until the appearance of a
visual stimulus. Interestingly, they found that movements were initiated faster
when the orientation of the go stimulus was consistent with the orientation of the
to-be-grasped object. In the same study, consistency effects were found when
after preparation of a hand movement, participants were instructed to inhibit
the prepared grasping movement and to respond with a different motor effector.
Craighero et al. (1999) concluded that the mere preparation of an action is
capable to facilitate the processing of visual stimuli if it contains features that
are consistent with the preactivated action plan.
In addition to and consistent with the reported perceptual effects of action
preparation, the current study suggests that the principles of selection for action
are also operational at the level of semantics. Our data suggest that functional
semantic information about objects is activated in association with the action
intention of the subject. For example, although cups are typically brought to the
mouth for drinking, we assume that the concept of mouth is activated stronger
when there is the intention to bring the object to the mouth as when some
other response is required. In fact, our results suggest that the goal location
of the object use is not activated when there is no specific intention to interact
with the object. That is, when subjects received the instruction to perform
finger-lifting movements, the facilitation of words, which are consistent with the
goal locations of the object use, was absent. These results suggest that func-
tional semantic information about how to respond to objects requires motor
processing in order to become activated. A theoretically comparable idea in
the field of perception and action is expressed by the premotor theory of visual
attention (Rizzolatti, Riggio, & Sheliga, 1994), which suggests that allocating
visual attention in space involves covert activation of the eye movement system.
In this perspective, action preparation no longer just facilitates the selection
of perceptual information, but perceptual processes themselves require motor
support. A similar mechanism might, in theory, be applicable also to the ac-
tivation of semantic representations. That is, functional semantic information
about the use of objects may require activation of motor representations to en-
able the semantic information to be addressed. Similar proposals have been
made with respect to visual semantic knowledge about the appearance of ob-
jects (Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995; van Schie, Wijers,
Mars, Benjamins, & Stowe, 2005). Lesions in visual areas of the brain (occipi-
totemporal area) sometimes not only result in perceptual deficits, but may also
impair the activation of knowledge about the visual properties of objects (re-
view in Humphreys & Forde, 2001). Comparable ideas have been expressed with
respect to functional semantic knowledge in which lesions in motor areas of the
brain are held responsible for subjects’ impairments to represent the functional
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properties of objects (review in Saffran & Schwartz, 1994). A growing number of
neuroimaging studies furthermore affirm the idea that visual and motor repre-
sentations support semantic knowledge about the use and appearance of objects
(e.g., Pulvermu¨ller, 1999; Tranel, Kemmerer, Adolphs, Damasio, & Damasio,
2003). One advance of the present study is that it provides behavioral support
for existing neuropsychological and neuroimaging results, which suggest that
accessing functional semantic information about objects involves an activation
of specific motor representations.
Whereas an increasing amount of research is directed at the use of motor repre-
sentations for semantics, the reverse relationship concerning the use of semantic
information for actions has received much less attention. As a consequence, the
contribution of semantics for use of objects is still not fully understood (see
Rumiati & Humphreys, 1998; Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Buxbaum et al., 1997).
For example, neuropsychological studies (e.g., Buxbaum et al., 1997; Riddoch
et al., 1989) and behavioral studies with time-limited conditions (Rumiati &
Humphreys, 1998) suggest that semantic knowledge can be bypassed when se-
lecting an action as response to objects. This shows that an involvement of se-
mantics in action planning is not obligatory and has led Riddoch et al. (1989) to
conclude that a direct route from vision to action exists in addition to a semantic
route. Nevertheless, some experimental findings support information-processing
models for action, which propose that access to stored semantic knowledge about
an object is utilized to generate correct object-directed actions (MacKay, 1985).
For example, a recent study of Creem and Proffitt (2001) shows that semantic
processing is required when grasping ordinary household tools appropriately for
their use. They observed that subjects’ grasping was frequently inappropriate
when the motor task was paired with an additional semantic task but not when
paired with a visuospatial task. In congruence with these findings, the present
study demonstrates the important role for functional semantic knowledge in ac-
tion preparation and provides evidence for the notion that action semantics are
routinely activated with the preparation and execution of goal-directed actions.
In addition to the rather general conclusion that semantics are involved in ob-
ject use, the results of the present study clearly indicate that action semantics are
activated selectively in accordance with the actor’s specific intention. In other
words, depending on the person’s current behavioral goal, different functional
object properties become relevant and activate as a result of different aspects of
semantic action knowledge. This conclusion does not contradict the results of
neuroimaging experiments that find motor areas activated to the presentation
of manipulable objects (Chao & Martin, 2000; Creem-Regehr & Lee, 2005) or
the findings of behavioral studies suggesting that the mere perception of tools
automatically potentiates components of the actions they afford (Tucker & Ellis,
1998; Ellis & Tucker, 2000). In contrast to these studies, however, the present
study points out the modulating role of action intentions on the activation of
action knowledge related to an object in a functional-relevant way.
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In conclusion, the advance that is made with the present paradigm is that we
were able to establish a measure of semantic action knowledge as it is activated
in the process of action preparation. Our finding of an action word-processing
interaction suggests that the selection-for-action hypothesis is not just restricted
to the domain of perception and action, but it is to be extended to the field of
semantics. This insight certainly calls for further investigation. More scien-
tific interest into the area of semantic action knowledge is expected to increase
our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie the planning and
control of motor actions.
61
3 Action and Semantic Processing
62
Chapter 4
Action and Number
Processing
Numerical Magnitude Priming in Object Grasping
4 Action and Number Processing
Abstract. To investigate the functional connection between nu-
merical cognition and action planning, we required participants
to perform different grasping responses depending on the parity
status of Arabic digits. The results showed that precision grip ac-
tions were initiated faster in response to small numbers, whereas
power grips were faster to large numbers. Moreover, analyses
of the grasping kinematics revealed an enlarged maximum grip
aperture in the presence of large numbers. RT effects remained
present when controlling for the number of fingers used while
grasping but disappeared when participants pointed to the ob-
ject. Our data indicate a priming of size-related motor features
by numerals and support the idea that representations of numbers
and actions share common cognitive codes within a generalized
magnitude system.
This chapter is based on: Lindemann, O., Abolafia, J. M., Gi-
rardi, G., & Bekkering, H. (2007). Getting a Grip on Numbers:
Numerical Magnitude Priming in Object Grasping. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
33 (6), 1400-1409.
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4.1 Introduction
In the last few decades many authors have emphasized that cognitive represen-
tations of perceptual and semantic information can never be fully understood
without considering their impact on actions (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). In this
context interactions between perception and action have been extensively stud-
ied (for a review see e.g., Hommel, Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). More
recently, researchers also started to focus on the interactions between language
and action (e.g., Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani, Daprati, & Gangitano, 2000;
Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006; Lindemann, Stenneken, van
Schie, & Bekkering, 2006). However, a cognitive domain that has been hardly
investigated in respect to its impact on motor control is the processing of num-
bers. This is surprising since information about magnitude plays an important
role in both cognition and action. Accurate knowledge about size or quantity
is not only required for high-level cognitive processes such as number compre-
hension and arithmetic (Dehaene, 1997; Butterworth, 1999) but also for the
planning of grasping movements (Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 1995;
Castiello, 2005). Since magnitude processing in mathematical cognition and in
motor control has been studied typically independent from each other, little is
known about possible interactions between these two cognitive domains.
Interestingly, some authors have recently argued that the coding of magni-
tude information may reflect a direct link between number processing and action
planning (Walsh, 2003; Go¨bel & Rushworth, 2004; Rossetti, Jacquin-Courtois,
Rode, Ota, Michel, & Boisson, 2004). This idea is so far primarily based on
neuroimaging studies that found an overlap in activated brain areas during pro-
cesses related to numerical judgments and those related to manual motor tasks.
In particular, the intraparietal sulcus has been suggested to be the locus of an
abstract representation of magnitude information (for a review see Dehaene,
Molko, Cohen, & Wilson, 2004).
At the same time, it is widely agreed that this particular brain region, as part
of the dorsal visual pathway, is also concerned with visuomotor transformations
and the encoding of spatial information required for motor actions (see, e.g.,
Culham & Valyear, 2006). Based on these findings, Walsh (2003) proposed a
neuropsychological model of magnitude representation, which states that space
and quantity information are represented by a single generalized magnitude sys-
tem located in the parietal cortex. Such a system may provide a common metric
for all sorts of magnitude information whether this information relates to nu-
merical quantities while counting or to physical sizes of objects while performing
grasping actions. In other words, the model claims that number cognition and
action planning are linked by a shared abstract representation of magnitude,
which is strongly connected with the human motor system.
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Indirect behavioral evidence that symbolic magnitude information interferes
with motor processes has been provided by language-based studies. For ex-
ample, Gentilucci et al. (2000) reported that grasping actions are affected by
words representing size-related semantic information (see also Glover & Dixon,
2002; Glover, Rosenbaum, Graham, & Dixon, 2004). Gentilucci et al. required
participants to grasp objects on which different word labels had been attached,
and they observed that the word large leads to a larger maximum grip aperture
when reaching out for the object than does the word small. This finding in-
dicates that the processing of size-related semantic information interferes with
action planning. However, as demonstrated by behavioral, neuropsychological,
and animal research, semantic knowledge about magnitudes constitutes a very
domain-specific cognitive ability that does not require any verbal processing but
is based on a language-independent abstract representation of quantity and size
(e.g., Brannon, 2006; Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Cohen, 1998; Gallistel
& Gelman, 2000). Consequently, the findings of an interference effect between
semantics and action can hardly be generalized to the domain of numerical cog-
nition, and it remains an open question whether number processing interferes
with action planning, as would be predicted by the notion of a generalized mag-
nitude system.
A characteristic property of nonverbal number representations is the direct
coupling of magnitude information with spatial features (Fias & Fischer, 2005;
Hubbard, Piazza, Pinel, & Dehaene, 2005). Such an association between num-
bers and space is nicely demonstrated by the so-called SNARC effect (i.e., the
effect of spatial- numerical associations of response codes), which was first re-
ported by Dehaene, Bossini, and Giraux (1993). These authors required their
participants to indicate the parity status of Arabic digits (i.e., odd or even) by
left and right keypress responses, and they observed that responses with the left
hand were executed faster in the presence of relatively small numbers as com-
pared with large numbers. Responses with the right hand, however, were faster
in the presence of large numbers. The SNARC effect has been interpreted as evi-
dence that numerical magnitude is spatially represented—an idea that has often
been described with the metaphor of a ”mental number line” on which numbers
are represented in ascending order from the left side to the right. Although the
origin of spatial numerical associations is still under debate (see Fischer, 2006;
Keus & Schwarz, 2005), there is growing evidence suggesting that SNARC ef-
fects do not emerge at the stage of motor preparation or motor execution. For
example, it is known that spatial-numerical associations are independent from
motor effectors, because they can be observed for different types of lateralized
responses such as pointing movements (Fischer, 2003), eye movements (Fischer,
Warlop, Hill, & Fias, 2004; Schwarz & Keus, 2004), and foot responses (Schwarz
& Mu¨ller, 2006). Additionally, it has been shown that numbers not only affect
the initiation times of lateralized motor response but can also induce atten-
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tional (Fischer, Castel, Dodd, & Pratt, 2003) and perceptual biases (Calabria
& Rossetti, 2005; Fischer, 2001). These findings suggest that space-number in-
terferences occur during perceptual processing or response selection but not in
later, motor-related stages of processing. Recently, this interpretation received
direct support from electrophysiological experiments on the functional locus of
the SNARC effect (Keus, Jenks, & Schwarz, 2005). Regarding the idea of a gen-
eralized magnitude system, SNARC and SNARC-like effects can be considered
evidence that numbers and space are coded on a common metric, but it appears
to be unlikely that they reflect an interaction between number processing and
motor control.
However, if numerical cognition and motor control share a cognitive represen-
tation of magnitude, numerical information should affect the preparation or exe-
cution of motor response. In other words, effects of numerical magnitude should
be present not only in movement latencies but also in the kinematic parameters
of an action. Moreover, the notion of a generalized magnitude system implies
that numerical stimulus-response compatibility effects are not restricted to as-
sociations with spatial locations as indicated by the SNARC effect and, rather,
predicts a direct interaction between numerical and action-related magnitude
coding. Consequently, the processing of numerical magnitudes should affect the
programming of size-related motor aspects—an effect that could be described
as a within-magnitude priming effect of numbers on actions (see Walsh, 2003).
Initial supporting evidence for this hypothesis has come from the observation
of an interaction between number processing and finger movements recently re-
ported by Andres, Davare, Pesenti, Olivier, and Seron (2004). In this study,
participants were required to hold the hand in such a way that the aperture
between index finger and thumb was slightly open. Then participants judged
the parity status of a visually presented Arabic digit and indicated their decision
by means of a flexion or extension of the two fingers (i.e., a closing or opening
of the hand). Electromyographic recordings of the hand muscles indicated that
closing responses were initiated faster in the presence of small numbers as com-
pared with large numbers, whereas opening responses were faster in the presence
of large numbers. This interaction between number size and finger movements
constitutes an interesting example of a numerical priming of size- related ac-
tion features. Andres et al. (2004) argued that the performed movements may
represent mimicked grasping actions and supposed that the observed interac-
tion may point to an interference between number processing and the compu-
tation of an appropriate grip aperture needed for object grasping. However, to
date, there has been little empirical evidence that numerals affect reach-to-grasp
movements. To test this hypothesis directly, we decided to investigate natural
grasping movements that involve, in contrast to finger movements, a physical
object and that comprise a reaching phase, which is characterized by both an
opening and a closing of the hand (see Castiello, 2005).
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Thus, the present study investigated the effects of number processing on the
planning and execution of prehension movements to test the hypothesis that
numerical cognition and motor control share a common representation of mag-
nitude. As mentioned above, previous research has demonstrated that reach-to-
grasp movements are sensitive to abstract semantic information (Gentilucci et
al., 2000; Glover & Dixon, 2002; Glover et al., 2004). Considering this and the
fact that the planning to grasp an object depends to a large extent on magni-
tude processing, since it requires a translation of physical magnitude information
(i.e., object size) into an appropriate grip aperture, grasping responses appeared
to us to be promising candidates to study the presumed functional connection
between numbers and actions. To be precise, we expected that the processing of
Arabic numbers could prime the processing of size-related action features (i.e.,
a within-magnitude priming effect; cf. Walsh, 2003) and, consequently, affect
the initiation times and movements kinematics of reach-to-grasp movements.
4.2 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 investigated whether processing of numerical magnitude informa-
tion affects the response latencies and movement kinematics of grasping move-
ments. Participants had to judge the parity status of visually presented Arabic
digits. Decisions had to be indicated by means of two different reach-to-grasp
movements toward a single target object placed in front of the participants.
Specifically, participants were required to grasp the object with either a pre-
cision grip (i.e., grasping the small segment of the object with the thumb and
index finger) or a power grip (i.e., grasping the large object segment with the
whole hand). If magnitude representations for numerical cognition and action
planning have a common basis, we expected to find a stimulus-response compat-
ibility effect between number magnitude and the prehension act. Thus, power
grip actions should be initiated faster in response to relatively large numbers,
and precision grip actions should be initiated faster in response to relatively
small numbers.
Since it is known from research on eye-hand coordination that participants
tend to fixate a to-be-grasped object before initiating the reach-to-grasp move-
ment (Land, 2006), we obscured the right hand and the object from the view of
the participants and trained them to grasp the object correctly without visual
feedback. There were two major reasons for the use of memory-guided grasping
actions in this paradigm: First, if actions have to be executed without visual
feedback, participants’ visual attention remains constantly directed toward the
parity judgment task until the movement is executed and does not alternate
between the to-be-grasped object and the monitor. The task requirements as
well as the reaction time (RT) measurements are therefore comparable to those
68
4.2 Experiment 1
in classical number processing experiments using buttonpress responses. Sec-
ond, online adjustments of memory-guided actions are more difficult to perform
than are adjustments of visually guided actions (e.g., Schettino, Adamovich, &
Poizner, 2003). As a result, participants are less prone to execute the reaching
movements before they have completed their judgment and selected the required
grip. This control is crucial for our paradigm, because the hypothesized response
latency effects can be only detected if number processing and grip selection are
fully completed before the initiation of the reach-to-grasp movement. With re-
spect to the measurement of the maximum grip apertures, it is noteworthy to
mention that several studies have shown that hand kinematics during memory-
guided grasping actions do not differ from those found during visually guided
actions (Land, 2006; Santello, Flanders, & Soechting; 2002; Winges, Weber, &
Santello, 2003). It seems, therefore, to be unlikely that the absence of visual
feedback influences the appearance of potential number magnitude effects in the
grip aperture data.
4.2.1 Method
Participants
Fourteen students of Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands,
participated in the experiment in return of 4.50 Euros or course credit. All were
naive regarding the purpose of the study, had normal or corrected-to- normal
vision, and were free of any motor problems that would have influenced their
performance on the task.
Setup and stimuli
Participants sat in front of a computer screen (viewing distance: 70 cm) and were
required to grasp a wooden object consisting of two segments: a larger cylinder
(diameter: 6 cm; height: 7 cm) at the bottom and a much smaller cylinder
(diameter: 0.7 cm; height: 1.5 cm) attached on top of it (see Figure 4.1). The
object was placed at the right side of the table behind an opaque screen (height:
44 cm; width: 45 cm), allowing a participant to reach it comfortably with his
or her right hand but without the possibility of visual control (see Figure 4.1A).
At a distance of 30 cm from the object center, we fixed a small pin (height: 0.5
cm; diameter: 0.5 cm), which served as a marker for the starting position of the
reach-to-grasp movements. As stimuli for the parity judgment task we chose
the Arabic digits 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9 printed in a black sans serif font on a light
gray background. They were displayed at the center of the computer screen and
subtended a vertical visual angle of approximately 1.8◦.
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Figure 4.1: Basic experimental setup. A: Participants sat at a table with a computer screen
and a manipulandum. An opaque screen obscured the to-be-grasped object and the right hand
from view. B: The object consisted of two segments: a large cylinder at the bottom affording
a power grip and a small cylinder at the top affording a precision grip.
Procedure
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were required to practice grasp-
ing the object with either the whole hand at its large segment (i.e., power grip)
or with thumb and index finger at its small segment (i.e., precision grip). Fig-
ure 4.1B illustrates the two required responses in the experiment. Only if partic-
ipants were able perform the grasping movements correctly and fluently without
vision was the experimental trial block started.
The participants task was to indicate as soon as possible the parity status
of the presented Arabic digit (i.e., even vs. odd) by means of the practiced
motor responses. That is, depending on the parity status, the participant was
required to reach out and grasp the object with either a power or a precision
grip. However, in the case of the digit 5, participants were required to refrain
from responding. This no-go condition was introduced to ensure that reaching
movements were not initiated before the number was processed and the parity
judgment was made.
Each trial began with the presentation of a gray fixation cross at the center
of the screen. If the participant placed his or her hand correctly at the start-
ing position, the cross turned black and disappeared 1,000 ms later. After a
delay of random length between 250 ms and 2,000 ms, the digit was presented.
Participants judged its parity status and executed the corresponding grasping
movements. The digit disappeared with the onset of the reach-to-grasp move-
ment or after a maximal presentation time of 1,000 ms. After an intertrial
interval of 2,000 ms, the next trial started. If participants moved their hands
before the digit was shown or if they responded on a no-go trial, a red stop sign
combined with a 4400-Hz beep sound lasting 200 ms was presented as an error
signal.
70
4.2 Experiment 1
Design
The mapping between digit parity and required grasping response was coun-
terbalanced between participants. That is, half of the participants performed
a power grip action in response to even digits and a precision grip action in
response to odd digits. For the other half, the stimulus-response mapping was
reversed.
The digits 1, 2, 8, and 9 were presented 50 times. The experiment thus
comprised 100 power grip responses and 100 precision grip responses, whereas
each grip type had to be performed toward both small and large digits. Addi-
tionally, there were 25 no-go trials (i.e., digit 5 ). All trials were presented in a
randomized sequence. The experiment lasted about 45 min.
Data acquisition and analysis
An electromagnetic position-tracking system (miniBIRD 800TM , Ascension
Technology Corporation, Burlington, VT) was used to record hand movements.
Two sensors were attached on the thumb and index finger of the participant’s
right hand. The sampling rate was 100 Hz (static spatial resolution: 0.5 mm).
The movement kinematics were analyzed oﬄine. We applied a fourth-order
Butterworth lowpass filter with a cutoff frequency of 10 Hz on the raw position
data. The onset of a movement was defined as the first moment in time when
the tangential velocity of the index finger sensor exceeded the threshold of 10
cm/s. We used reversed criteria to determine movement offset. For each par-
ticipant and each experimental condition, we computed the mean RT (i.e., the
time elapsed between onset of the digit and the onset of the reaching movement)
and the mean maximum grip aperture (i.e., average of the maximum Euclidean
distances between thumb and index finger during the time between reach onset
and offset).
Anticipation responses (i.e., responses before onset of the go signal and RTs
< 100 ms), missing responses (i.e., no reactions and RTs < 1,500 ms), incorrect
motor responses (i.e., all trials on which participants failed to hit the object
or stopped their reaching and initiated a new reach-to-grasp movement), and
incorrect parity judgments were considered errors and excluded from further
statistical analyses. In all statistical tests, a Type I error rate of α = .05
was used. To report standardized effect size measurements, we calculated the
parameter omega squared (ω2), as suggested by Kirk (1996).
4.2.2 Results
Anticipations and missing responses occurred on 0.3% of trials; 2.7% of the
grasping responses were performed incorrectly. The error rate for the parity
judgments was 2.2%.
71
4 Action and Number Processing
Figure 4.2: Mean response latencies in
Experiment 1 as a function of the fac-
tors Number Magnitude and Type of
Grip.
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The mean RT data were submitted to a two-way repeated measures analyses
of variance (ANOVA) with the factors number magnitude (small magnitude: 1
and 2 ; large magnitude: 8 and 9 ) and type of grip (power grip, precision grip).
Figure 4.2 depicts the mean RTs. Power grip responses (605 ms) were initiated
faster than precision grip responses (621 ms), F (1, 13) = 5.17, p < .05, ωˆ2 = .13.
Most important, however, the analysis yielded a significant Number Magnitude
× Type of Grip interaction, F (1, 13) = 7.13, p = .05, ωˆ2 = .10. That is,
precision grips were initiated faster to small numbers (612 ms) than to large
numbers (631 ms), t(13) = 2.30, p < .05. This difference appeared to be reversed
for the power grip responses, for which actions were initiated faster to large (600
ms) than to small numbers (609 ms). This contrast, however, failed to become
significant, t(13) = 1.10, p = .32.
The mean maximum grip apertures were analyzed with the same two-way
ANOVA as used for the RT data (see Table 4.1 for means). The main effect of
type of grip was significant, F (1, 13) = 376.50, p < .001, which reflects the trivial
fact that maximum grip aperture was larger for the power grip responses (120.0
mm) than for the precision grip responses (75.0 mm). Interestingly, we also
found a main effect of number magnitude, F (1, 13) = 5.31, p < .05, ωˆ2 = .13.
This finding indicates that grip apertures were somewhat larger in the context
of large numbers (97.8 mm) than in the context of small numbers (97.2 mm).
The Type of Grip × Number Magnitude interaction did not reach significance,
F (1, 13) = 3.80, p = .08.
4.2.3 Discussion
Experiment 1 demonstrates a magnitude priming effect of numerals on grasping
latencies. That is, the grasping responses to small digits were initiated faster if
the object had to be grasped with a precision grip, and responses to large num-
bers were relatively faster if a power grip was required. In addition, we found
that number magnitude affected the grasping kinematics (i.e., the maximum
72
4.2 Experiment 1
Table 4.1: Mean Maximum Grip Aperture (in mm) During Reach-to-Grasp Movements in
Experiment 1 and 3 as a Function of the Factors Number Magnitude and Type of Grip.
Experiment 1 Experiment 3
Small Numbers Large Numbers Small Numbers Large Numbers
Precision Grip 74.6 75.9 73.7 74.2
Power Grip 119.6 119.7 116.3 117.0
Mean 97.2 97.8 95.0 95.6
grip apertures were enlarged when the object was grasped in presence of a large
number). Although the Type of Grip × Number Magnitude interaction was not
significant, the mean maximum grip apertures seem to suggest that the main
effect of number magnitude was restricted to the precision grip actions. A pos-
sible reason for this dissociation is the fact that many participants had to open
their hand to a maximum degree to perform the power grip response and clasp
the bottom cylinder, which had a large diameter. Under these circumstances,
the processing of large numbers can hardly result in a further enlargement of
the grip aperture. The number magnitude effect on the grasping kinematics is
therefore less pronounced, for it could be observed for precision grip actions.
The magnitude priming effect on grasping latencies and the number effect on
grip aperture indicate that the processing of numbers has an impact on pre-
hension actions. Both findings are in line with the hypothesis that numerical
cognition and action planning share common cognitive codes within a general-
ized system for magnitude representation (Walsh, 2003). A possible objection
to the interpretation that the numerical magnitudes primed the size-related mo-
tor features of the grasping actions is that the two responses not only varied
with respect to the required grip size (i.e., precision or power grip) but were
also directed toward different parts of the object. That is, each precision grip
was directed toward the small top segment, whereas each power grip was di-
rected toward the large bottom segment. Therefore, the possibility cannot be
excluded that the observed response latency differences reflect a compatibility
effect between numerical magnitudes and spatial response features along the
vertical direction. That is, it might be possible that responses to the top were
facilitated for small numbers and responses to the bottom were facilitated for
large numbers. Such SNARC-like effects for the vertical direction have been
previously shown by different researchers (e.g., Ito & Hatta, 2004; Schwarz &
Keus, 2004). However, such studies consistently suggest spatial-numerical as-
sociations of upward movements with large numbers and downward movements
with small numbers. Although we observed the opposite pattern of effects in
Experiment 1, we cannot exclude at this point the possibility that the differ-
ences in the latencies of the grasping response might have been driven by a
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reversed vertical SNARC effect. A second possibility to account for the data
of Experiment 1 is the assumption of correspondence effects between the nu-
merical size and the size of the object segment to which the action is directed.
That is, reach-to-grasp responses toward the small or large segment could be
facilitated in response to small or large numbers, respectively. This possible
association between abstract magnitude information and physical object prop-
erties would also argue against our interpretation of numerical priming effects
on grasping actions. To evaluate these alternative explanations, we conducted
a second experiment.
4.3 Experiment 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to control for a possible confound of the required
grip size and the relative vertical goal location of the reaching movements in
Experiment 1 and, thus, to exclude the possibility that the observed response
latency effects were driven by a spatial association between numerical magni-
tudes and the vertical dimension (e.g., a vertical SNARC effect). To do so,
we required the participants in Experiment 2 to merely reach out for the ob-
ject without grasping it (i.e., pointing movement). That is, the parity status
of Arabic digit had to be indicated by means of pointing movements toward
the small top or large bottom segment of the object. If our previous findings
reflected a reversed vertical SNARC effect or a compatibility effect between
number size and the size of the object segments that served as goal locations
for the response, the same response latency effects should be present in pointing
movements. However, if the effects reflected a priming effect of aperture size, the
intention to grasp should be crucial to finding stimulus-response compatibility
effects between numerical information and object-directed actions. In that case,
we would expect pointing responses to be unaffected by the presented digits.
4.3.1 Method
Participants
Twenty-two students of Radboud University Nijmegen participated in Exper-
iment 2 in return for 4.50 Euros or course credit. None of them had taken
part in the previous experiment. All were naive regarding the purpose of the
experiment and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Setup and stimuli
The experimental setup and stimuli were identical to those of Experiment 1.
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Procedure
The procedure and the design were virtually the same as in Experiment 1.
The only modification was that instead of the previous grasping movements,
participants performed pointing movements. That is, depending on the parity
status of the presented digit, the participants were required to point either to
the small top or to the large bottom segment of the object. Since the pointing
movements needed to be performed accurately without sight, the responses were
again practiced at the beginning of the experiment.
Design
Half of the participants had to point to the small top segment in response to
even digits and to the large bottom segment in response to odd digits. The
other half were given the reverse stimulus-response mapping. The experiment
again comprised 225 trials (50 repetitions of the digits 1, 2, 8, and 9 plus 25
no-go trials with the digit 5 ) presented in a random order and lasted about 30
minutes.
Data acquisition and analysis
An electromagnetic motion-tracking sensor was attached to the participant’s
right index finger and used to record the pointing trajectories. Movement onsets
were determined and analyzed as described in Experiment 1. In addition, we
calculated for each pointing trajectory the path curvature index (PCI), which
was defined as the ratio of the largest deviation of the pointing trajectory from
the line connecting the movement’s start and end locations to the length of this
line (see Desmurget, Prablanc, Jordan, & Jeannerod, 1999).
Trials with incorrect parity judgments were excluded from the RT analysis.
To increase the chance of finding an effect of number magnitude on pointing, we
also considered movements with strongly curved trajectories (i.e., movements
with a PCI larger than .50) to be incorrect responses, because in these cases
participants may have initiated the pointing movement before having completed
their parity judgment, or they may have corrected their judgment during the
movement.
4.3.2 Results
Anticipation and missing responses occurred on 0.4% of trials; 2.6% of the point-
ing movements were performed incorrectly (i.e., PCI>.50).1 The average error
rate for parity judgments was 1.1%.
1A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with the factors number magnitude (small, large) and
pointing goal location (small top segment, large bottom segment) on the error data (i.e.,
amount of incorrect performed motor response) yielded no significant effects (all ps> .20).
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Figure 4.3: Mean response latencies in Ex-
periment 2 as a function of the factors Num-
ber Magnitude and Pointing Goal Location.
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We applied a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with the factors number
magnitude (small, large) and pointing goal location (small top segment, large
bottom segment) to the RT data (see Figure 4.3) and the PCI data (see Ta-
ble 4.2 for means). Pointing movements toward the small top segment (530 ms)
were initiated faster than were movements to the large bottom segment (543
ms), F (1, 21) = 4.80, p < .05, ωˆ2 = .08. Responses to small numbers (541
ms) were faster than responses to large numbers (531 ms), F (1, 21) = 7.38,
p < .01, ωˆ2 = .12. Most important, however, the analysis did not show a signif-
icant Number Magnitude × Pointing Goal Location interaction, F (1, 21) < 1,
even though the statistical power2 of the performed ANOVA was sufficient to
detect an interaction effect that was only half the size of the effect found in
Experiment 1–that is, (1 − β) = .83 for an expected ω2 = .05 and an assumed
population correlation between all factor levels of ρ = .75 (conservatively esti-
mated from the observed empirical correlations).
The analysis of the PCI data revealed that pointing movements toward the
top segment (PCI < .29) were more curved than the movements toward the
bottom segment (PCI < .20), F (1, 21) = 26.98, p < .001. Importantly, there
were no significant effects of number magnitude or the Number Magnitude ×
Pointing Goal Location interaction, both F s(1, 21) < 1.5, which shows that
number processing had no impact on the pointing kinematics.
4.3.3 Discussion
If participants made pointing instead of grasping movements, the interaction
between numerical magnitudes and motor responses disappeared. Likewise, the
analysis of movement curvature data failed to reveal any influence of numer-
als. This absence of numerical magnitude effects on the pointing movements
excludes the possibility that the priming effects observed in Experiment 1 were
2The statistical power analysis was conducted using theG*Power 3 program (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2007).
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Table 4.2: Mean Path Curvature Indices for Pointing Movements in Experiment 2 as a
Function of Number Magnitude and Pointing Goal Location.
Segment Small Numbers Large Numbers
Small Top .29 .29
Large Bottom .20 .21
Mean .24 .25
driven by spatial associations between numbers and relative vertical locations
or by associations between number magnitude and physical object size. Since
other authors have reported numerical associations with locations along the ver-
tical axis, it is possible that the absence of effects for pointing movements was
caused by two opposite effects resulting from contrary associations of numerical
magnitude with vertical space (i.e., a vertical SNARC effect) and with physical
object size (i.e., an association between number and size of object segment).
Independent of this speculation, however, the outcome in Experiment 2 shows
clearly that numerals did not affect motor actions if responses did not involve a
grasping component and consisted only of a pointing movement. Taking these
together with the results of Experiment 1, we can conclude therefore that the
intention to grasp is a prerequisite for the present of numerical magnitude prim-
ing of actions, which in turn indicates that the observed interference effects must
have emerged during the selection and preparation of the grip.
Nevertheless, our interpretation of a within-magnitude priming effect between
numerical cognition and action planning could still be questioned. The reason
is that the motor responses in Experiment 1 differed not only with respect to
the size of the required grip but also with respect to the number of fingers that
had to be used for grasping. That is, precision grips always implied grasping
movements with two fingers (e.g., only thumb and index finger), whereas power
grips always involved the use of all five fingers of the hand. Therefore, we
cannot exclude the possibility that our findings were driven by the different
number of fingers involved in the grasping responses. Such an explanation is not
farfetched, and it appears to be even plausible to assume that there is a strong
association between the fingers of the hand and the semantic knowledge about
numerical magnitudes (see, e.g., Di Luca, Grana, Semenza, Seron, & Pesenti,
2006). This connection is, for instance, nicely illustrated by children’s use of
finger-counting strategies when learning to deal with abstract quantities. And
in fact, empirical evidence for this relation comes from developmental studies
indicating that the performance of a child in a finger agnosia test is a good
predictor for later numerical skills (Noel, 2005). Moreover, neuropsychological
research has shown that symptoms of finger agnosia are often associated with
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symptoms of dyscalculia (so-called Gerstmann’s syndrome; Mayer et al., 1999).
Consequently, we conducted a third experiment to control for the number of
fingers involved in the grasping responses.
4.4 Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we sought to provide further evidence that number processing
interferes with the processing of action-coded magnitude information for motor
preparation, and we aimed to exclude the possibility that this compatibility
effect was caused by overlearned associations between numbers and the fingers
of the hand. To do so, we tested whether magnitude priming effects of numerals
could also be found in grasping movements that required a fixed number of
fingers for both required types of grip. As in the first experiment, participants
grasped the object in different ways to indicate the parity status of Arabic digits.
Now, however, power and precision grips both had to be performed with the
thumb and index finger only. Consequently, the two grasping responses differed
only in aperture size.3 To ensure that the ring, middle, and little fingers were
not used to grasp the target object, we required participants to hold a little stick
with these three fingers. If the response latency differences in Experiment 1 were
driven by a number-finger association, we should not observe any magnitude
priming effects. If, however, they reflected a magnitude priming of size-related
response features of the grasping action, we should be able to replicate our
previous findings.
4.4.1 Method
Participants
Eighteen students of Radboud University Nijmegen, none of whom had partic-
ipated in either of the previous experiments, took part in Experiment 3. The
participants were paid 4.50 Euros or received course credits. All were naive
regarding the purpose of the study and had normal or corrected- to-normal
vision.
Setup and stimuli
The experimental setup and stimuli were identical to those of Experiment 1.
3For reasons of simplicity, we keep the label power grip here for the grasping of the large
segment with the thumb and index finger, although the term is usually reserved for grasping
actions with all fingers of the hand.
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Figure 4.4: Mean response latencies in
Experiment 3 as a function of the fac-
tors Number Magnitude and Type of
Grip.
Procedure and design
The procedure and the experimental design were virtually identical to those of
Experiment 1. Again, participants were required to indicate the parity status of
the presented digits by performing different types of grasping responses with the
right hand. However, in contrast to Experiment 1, the object had to be grasped
with thumb and index finger only. That is, depending on the presented digits,
participants grasped the object with two fingers either at the large segment
(i.e., power grip) or at the small segment (i.e., precision grip). To ensure that
no other finger of the right hand were used for grasping, participants had to hold
a little stick (length: 5 cm; diameter: 1.5 cm) during the experiment between
their right middle, ring, and little fingers.
Data acquisition and analysis
Data acquisition and analysis methods were identical to those used in Experi-
ment 1. An additional motion-tracking sensor was mounted inside the stick and
used to make sure that participants held the stick in their right hand during all
trials.
4.4.2 Results
Anticipations and missing response occurred on 0.7% of trials; only 0.9% of the
grasping movements were performed incorrectly. The error rate for the parity
judgments was 1.6%.
The RT and grip aperture data (see Figure 4.4 and Table 4.1 on page 73)
were analyzed as in Experiment 1. The 2 (number magnitude: small vs. large)
× 2 (type of grip: precision grip vs. power grip) ANOVA of the RTs revealed
no main effects (both F s< 1). Importantly, a significant Number Magnitude ×
Type of Grip interaction was found, F (1, 17) = 5.46, p < .05, ωˆ2 = .06. Post-
hoc t-tests indicated that the precision grip RTs were shorter to small numbers
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(556 ms) than to large numbers (571 ms), t(17) = −2.13, p < .05, whereas for
the power grips, there was a non-significant trend toward the reversed effect—
that is, shorter RTs to large (560 ms) than to small numbers (571 ms), t(17) =
1.95, p = .058. The two-way ANOVA on the mean maximum grip apertures
revealed a main effect of type of grip, F (1, 17) = 292.76, p < .001, which showed
that the grip apertures were larger for power grip actions (116.7 mm) than for
precision grip actions (73.9 mm). Although the mean grip aperture difference
between responses toward small and large numbers was identical to the main
effect observed in Experiment 1, the factor number magnitude did not reach
statistical significance, F (1, 17) = 2.11, p = .16.
4.4.3 Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated the RT effect of Experiment 1 and showed an interaction
between numbers and grasping actions that involve a fixed number of fingers.
These findings exclude the possibility that the observed response latency effects
were driven by an association between numbers and the fingers of the hand, and
they provide additional support for the idea of numerical priming of size-related
motor features.
In contrast to Experiment 1, the size of the maximum grip apertures did
not differ for small and large numbers. A possible reason for this might be
that the grasping responses in Experiment 3 had to be performed in a rather
unnatural manner. Since participants were required to hold a stick with the
three remaining fingers while grasping the object with the thumb and index
finger, the responses were certainly more difficult to perform and might, thus,
have been more disturbed than those in Experiment 1. Evidence for this is
provided by the observation that the within-subject confidence interval for the
grip aperture data was larger for Experiment 3 than for Experiment 1.4 It is
therefore likely that the increased movement complexity was responsible for the
absence of grip aperture effects when objects had to be grasped with two fingers
only.
4.5 General Discussion
The present finding of an interaction between representations of numerical infor-
mation and representations of action-coded magnitude information for grasping
provides evidence for a close link between numerical cognition and motor con-
trol. We asked participants to indicate the parity status of visually presented
4The within-subject confidence intervals (cf. Loftus & Masson, 1994) for the mean maximum
grip apertures in presence of small and large numbers were ±0.56 in Experiment 1 and
±0.91 in Experiment 3.
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Arabic digits by means of different reach-to-grasp movements (Experiments 1
and 1) and observed that precision grip actions were initiated faster in response
to relatively small numbers, whereas power grip actions were initiated faster
in response to large numbers. This finding indicates a magnitude priming of
grasping actions by Arabic numerals. Besides this, we observed that numer-
ical magnitude also had an impact on grip aperture kinematics. With both
effects, we provide behavioral support for the idea that number processing and
action planning share common cognitive codes within a generalized system for
magnitude representation (Walsh, 2003).
Interestingly, the present study indicates that intention to grasp the object
was crucial for the interference between number processing and action planning.
Numerical magnitudes did not affect actions if they involved no grasping com-
ponent and consisted merely of a reaching movement (i.e., pointing response)
toward the smaller or larger (respectively, upper or lower) part of the object
(Experiment 2). These findings clearly excludes the possibility of a compati-
bility effect between numbers and the reaching component of actions—an effect
that could have been caused by an association of number size with the size of to-
be-grasped object part or with the end position of the reaching movement along
the vertical dimension (a vertical SNARC effect; Ito & Hatta, 2004; Schwarz &
Keus, 2004). In addition, we excluded the possibility that interactions between
grasping actions and number magnitude were driven by the different number
of fingers involved in the two different grasping responses, because the priming
effects of the Arabic numerals were also present when the grasping actions were
performed with two fingers only (Experiment 3).
Arabic numerals not only affected the time to plan and initiate the grasping
action but also influenced the way in which the action was performed. That
is, when participants grasped the object without any restrictions concerning
the fingers to be used, maximum grip apertures were enlarged in the presence of
large numbers. Taking these results together, we conclude that the processing of
numerical magnitude information somehow biased the processing of size-related
motor features in the preparation of grasping responses. It is possible that
this effect originated from processes in the dorsal pathway, where magnitude
information needed to select an appropriated grip aperture is computed and
represented (see Castiello, 2005).
The present magnitude priming effect in object grasping substantially extends
previous findings of numerical stimulus-response compatibility effects caused by
an association between numbers and spatial locations. The most prominent
example of this relationship is the SNARC effect, reflecting the tendency to
respond quickly with a left-side response to small and a right-side response to
large numbers (Dehaene et al., 1993; for review, see Hubbard et al., 2005).
So far, SNARC effects have been shown for several types of lateralized motor
responses (Fischer, 2003; Schwarz & Keus, 2004; Schwarz & Mu¨ller, 2006). It
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is important, however, to note that in the present study, the grasping actions
did not differ with respect to a lateralized left-right response feature. Instead,
participants always moved with the same hand toward the same object at the
same location. Consequently, the observed differences in the latencies of reaching
responses cannot be explained by an association between numbers and spatial
response features. Rather, our data reveal an interaction between numerical
magnitude information and size-related features of the motor response (i.e.,
the grip aperture). Thus, the demonstrated magnitude priming of grasping
actions shows also that numerical stimulus-response compatibility effects are
not restricted to an association between numerical values and spatial locations
along the mental number line (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1993).
The experiments reported here represent a direct behavioral test of the idea
of a generalized magnitude system for number processing and action planning.
Importantly, the present findings go beyond the number-finger-movement inter-
action previously shown by Andres et al. (2004). Although these authors also
speculated that the compatibility effects observed between numbers and the
extension/flexion of the index finger might be the result of a common represen-
tation involved in number processing and hand aperture control, the reported
evidence for this was quite indirect in that the task did not require any grasping
action. For example, it cannot be excluded that the effects in the study of An-
dres et al. were the results of an association between numbers and space along
the sagittal axis, because each response comprised an index finger movement
either toward or away from the body. The findings could be therefore also ex-
plained in terms of the more classical idea of the mental number line. Moreover,
the assumed connection with grasping behavior appears to be problematic, not
only because the actions did not involve objects but also because an opening
or closing of two fingers differs in several crucial motor features from natural
grasping movements. As is known from several studies of motor control, reach-
to-grasp movements always consist of both an opening and a closing of the hand
rather than a single change of the grip aperture (for review, see Castiello, 2005).
Since hand preshaping is strongly linked to the transport phase of the hand, we
argue that magnitude effects in grasping actions cannot be investigated appro-
priately without considering the whole reaching movement. It is thus important
to notice that, in contrast to previous work, the present findings were not driven
by finger movements per se and reflect an effect on reach onset times and grasp-
ing kinematics during reaching out for the target object. Since the observed
numerical magnitude priming is an effect of the intended end postures of the
grasping actions, our results indicate that the size of the required grip aperture
at the end of reaching is the crucial motor feature responsible for the observed
cognitive interference. This interpretation is in line with recent theories in the
field of motor control, assuming that the motor planning is guided mainly by the
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desired end postures of a goal-directed movement (Rosenbaum, Meulenbroek,
Vaughan, & Jansen, 2001). Taking our results together, the major advance
made by studying number effects on natural grasping actions is that our find-
ings provide clear-cut evidence for the presence of within-magnitude priming
between numbers and size-related motor features, and they demonstrate fur-
thermore that these effects emerge during action planning well before the object
is actually grasped.
Since, broadly speaking, Arabic digits represent an instance of symbolic se-
mantic information, our findings may also contribute to research investigating
the relationship between semantic processing and motor actions. Similar to the
current number effect on the grasping kinematics, an impact of word meanings
on the grip aperture has been demonstrated in several studies (Gentilucci et al.,
2000; Glover & Dixon, 2002; Glover et al., 2004). For example, semantic action
effects have been found for words representing categorical magnitude relations
(e.g., small, large) as well as for words denoting objects that are associated with
a specific physical size (e.g., grape, apple) and, therefore, also with a specific
type of grip (Tucker & Ellis, 2001). The present study extends these findings
and provides the first empirical evidence for a comparable grip aperture effect
of Arabic numerals. This shows that semantic effects on motor actions are not
restricted to words representing physical or relative magnitudes but can be also
elicited by stimuli representing knowledge about abstract and absolute mag-
nitudes. Glover and Dixon (2002) performed a very detailed analysis of grip
aperture kinematics and found that semantic effects of word reading are only
present very early on in the reach. As the hand approaches the target object,
this effect gradually declines. These authors concluded that semantic informa-
tion interferes with motor planning but not with processes of movement control,
which become effective only after an action has been initiated. Following this
reasoning, it is likely that the present kinematic effects of numbers also occurred
during motor preparation. We assume, therefore, that the grip aperture effects
of numerals originated from the same cognitive interference during the stage of
action planning as the magnitude priming effect found in the reaching latencies.
Several authors have suggested recently that semantic processing and ac-
tion planning should be understood as two mutually dependent processes (e.g.,
Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). This idea implies not only
that semantic processing affects action planning but also that action planning
may affect semantic processing. Evidence for this has been provided recently
by the observation that the planning and execution of an action can facilitate
semantic judgments on the meaning of action-related words or sentences (Lin-
demann et al., 2006; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). Whether such a reversed effect
of action planning on higher cognitive processes also exists for the processing of
numbers is an intriguing, open question for future investigations.
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In sum, not much is known about the role of magnitude information in the
coupling of motor control and other cognitive processes. The present study indi-
cates the existence of a functional connection between numerical cognition and
action planning. As the magnitude priming of grasping actions by Arabic digits
shows, the coding of numbers interferes with the coding of size-related response
features. This finding suggests that number processing and motor prepara-
tion share common cognitive codes (Hommel et al., 2001), and it supports in
particular the idea of a generalized magnitude system (Walsh, 2003) in which
representations of numbers and actions are linked by a common metric for size
and quantity information.
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Chapter 5
Intention and Number
Processing
Coding Strategies Influence Spatial-Numerical
Associations
5 Intention and Number Processing
Abstract. The tendency to respond faster with the left hand
to relatively small numbers and faster with the right hand to
relatively large numbers (SNARC effect) has been interpreted as
an automatic association of spatial and numerical information.
We investigated in two experiments the impact of task-irrelevant
memory representations on this effect. Participants memorized
three Arabic digits describing a left-to-right ascending number
sequence (e.g., 3-4-5 ), a descending sequence (e.g., 5-4-3 ) or a
disordered sequence (e.g., 5-3-4 ) and indicated afterwards the
parity status of a centrally presented digit (i.e., 1, 2, 8, or 9 )
with a left/right keypress response. As indicated by the reaction
times, the SNARC effect in the parity task was mediated by the
coding requirements of the memory tasks. That is, a SNARC
effect was only present after memorizing ascending or disordered
number sequences but disappeared after processing descending
sequences. Interestingly, the effects of the second task were only
present if all sequences within one experimental block had the
same type of order. Taken together, our findings are inconsistent
with the idea that spatial-numerical associations are the result
of an automatic and obligatory cognitive process but do suggest
that coding strategies might be responsible for the cognitive link
between numbers and space.
This chapter is based on: Lindemann, O., Abolafia, J. M., Pratt,
J., & Bekkering, H. (2008). Coding Strategies in Number Space:
Memory Requirements Influence Spatial-Numerical Associations.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 64 (4), 515-524.
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5.1 Introduction
Research in the field of mathematical cognition has accumulated evidence indi-
cating that cognitive representations of numerical magnitudes are closely linked
with representations of space. A striking demonstration of this connection is the
so called effect of the spatial numerical association of response codes (SNARC
effect), which reflects the tendency of participants to respond faster with the
left hand toward relatively small numbers and to respond faster with the right
hand toward relatively large numbers (Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux,1993). This
interaction between number size and spatial response features has been consis-
tently interpreted as evidence that numerical magnitude information are spa-
tially coded and associated with a mental continuum (“mental number line”)
on which numbers are consecutively arranged in an ascending order from the
left side to the right (for recent reviews see, e.g., Hubbard, Piazza, Pinel, &
Dehaene, 2005; Fias & Fischer, 2005).
Several authors have proposed that the spatial representation of numbers
along the mental number line can be described as an automatic and obligatory
process. In this context, automatic coding of numerical magnitude is understood
as a process that occurs without the intentional setting of the goal of the be-
haviour and does not require any conscious monitoring (see, e.g., Ganor-Stern,
Tzelgov, & Ellenbogen, 2007). The idea of an automatic coding of numerical
magnitude is supported by the findings showing that number magnitude effects
on lateralized motor responses emerge even when the processing of a presented
numeral is not required and irrelevant for solving the task (Fias, Lauwereyns
& Lammertyn, 2001; Gevers, Lammertyn, Notebaert, Verguts, & Fias, 2006).
Fias et al. (2001), for instance, reported a SNARC effect caused by numerals
presented as background stimuli while participants were required to discrimi-
nate the orientation of lines and interpreted that both the activation of number
meaning and the association of magnitude with space are obligatory cognitive
processes. Further support for the idea that merely looking at numbers evokes
an activation of spatial cognitive codes is coming from a study on visual-spatial
attention reported by Fischer, Castel, Dodd, and Pratt (2003). The authors
presented Arabic digits in the centre of the screen while participants preformed
a simple detection task and found a shift in covert attention to the left or right
side according to the relative size of the number. Although the cueing of visu-
ospatial attention by numerals has often been assessed as important evidence for
an automatic activation of the mental number line (Hubbard et al., 2005; Fias
& Fischer, 2005), it is important to notice that attentional effects of numbers
emerge far slower than effects of other symbolic cues with directional meaning
(e.g., the words ”left” and ”right”; Hommel, Pratt, Colzato, & Godijn, 2001).
There is also a growing body of evidence suggesting that SNARC effects are
influenced by top-down factors and that the associations between numbers and
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space are rather flexible. Since the first report of SNARC effects by Dehaene et
al. (1993), it is known that the same number can be linked with either the left
or the right side of space, depending on whether it is the smallest or the largest
in the used range of numbers. Moreover, it has been shown that the same set
of numerals evoke reversed SNARC effects if numbers are intentionally mapped
with locations using a different spatial frame of reference (Ba¨chthold, Baumu¨ller,
& Brugger, 1998; Vuilleumier, Ortigue, & Brugger, 2004; Ristic, Wright, King-
stone, 2006; Galfano, Rusconi, Umilta, 2006). For example, Ba¨chthold et al.
(1998) asked participants to make speeded responses toward numbers ranging
from 1 to 11 and instructed to conceive them either as distances on a ruler or
as hours on an analogue clock face. Participants in the ruler condition showed a
regular SNARC effect. Interestingly, in the clock face condition, where smaller
numbers had to be associated with the right side of space (e.g., 3 o’clock) and
large numbers with the left side (e.g., 9 o’clock), the SNARC effect reversed.
This strong impact of the task instruction on the effects of number reading
seems to suggest that the spatial coding of numerical magnitude can be dy-
namically adapted according to current task demands. Further support for
the notion that SNARC effects are flexible and not restricted to a left-to-right
oriented continuum can also be derived from the observation of large interindi-
vidual variability in the preferred default mapping of numbers and space. For
example, we know from studies with English, Arabic, and Japanese participants
that the spatial associations with numbers are strongly mediated by culturally
acquired reading or scanning habits (Dehaene et al., 1993; Zebian, 2005; Ito &
Hatta, 2004) as well as by learned finger-counting strategies (Di Luca, Grana`,
Semenza, Seron, & Pesenti, 2006). Taken together, there is accumulating ev-
idence that spatial-numerical associations vary across different situations and
across different groups of subjects. Thus, the SNARC effect may depend on the
spatial frame of reference which is intentionally used or required by the task.
In the same vein, Fischer (2006) recently proposed that the spatial repre-
sentation of numbers might be the result of an individual’s strategic decision
in the light of current task demands and not the consequence of an automatic
activation of the mental number line. Although there is evidence showing that
the selection of a spatial-numerical reference frame for magnitude representa-
tion depends on task demands as well as on cultural factors, the literature does
not provide consistent evidence whether the activation of spatial codes in num-
ber cognition is an automatic obligatory process or, conversely, whether it is
the result of a volitionally controlled cognitive strategy to deal with magnitude
information.
Importantly, a crucial criterion for describing a cognitive process as being
automatic is the absence of any dual task interference (see e.g., Palmeri, 2002).
Consequently, if the association between numbers and space can be described as
an automatic process, the presence of a SNARC effect should not be affected by
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requirements of a second unrelated task and should not interfere with spatial-
numerical cognitive codes activated at the same time. To our knowledge, there
is no definitive empirical evidence showing that the SNARC effect is either
sensitive, or insensitive, to interference from an unrelated number task. Given
this dearth in the literature, the goal of the present study was to test whether
the spatial representations of numbers in one task are modulated by the coding
requirements of a second simultaneously performed memory task. If number
processing results automatically in an activation of the mental number line,
the presence of the SNARC effect should not be influenced by the demands of
the second task. If the mental number line represents, however, the current
cognitive coding strategy of a person, the SNARC effect should be affected by
the sequential order of an activated memory representation and by an activation
of spatial mnemonic strategies for the second task.
5.2 Experiment 1
Participants were required to judge the parity status of Arabic numerals (parity
task) after they had memorized a short sequence of three digits for later recall
(memory task). The digits were arranged so that they formed a left-to-right
ascending number sequence (e.g., 3-4-5 ), a descending sequence (e.g., 5-4-3 )
or a disordered sequence (e.g., 5-3-4 ). The type of digit sequence was varied
between three experimental blocks. Assuming that the mapping of numbers onto
space is the result of a cognitive coding strategy (Fischer, 2006), the SNARC
effect in the parity task should be affected by the ordering of the digits in the
memory task. Specifically, we expect the SNARC effect to be diminished or
even reversed in the experimental block of descending number sequences.
5.2.1 Method
Participants
Twenty-two students of the Radboud University Nijmegen (2 males; average
age: 21.2) participated in the experiment in return for course credits.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Participants faced three horizontally aligned square outlines, which served as
placeholder boxes for the presentation of the number stimuli. From viewing
distance of about 70 cm, each of these frames measured 3.8◦ of visual angle.
All numbers were printed in black sans serif fonts on light gray background and
subtended a horizontal visual angle of about 1.3◦. Reaction times were measured
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of the sequence of
events in Experiment 1 and 2. (a) Partici-
pants memorized the locations of three dig-
its before (b) judging the parity status of
the centrally presented digit. (c) Each trial
ended with a recall of the location of one of
the three digits. See text for detailed de-
scriptions.
(c)
(b)
(a)
with using a custom-built external response box with three horizontally aligned
buttons.
The to-be-memorized number sequences were composed of three consecutive
Arabic digits between 3 and 7. They could be subdivided in three categories:
sequences with a left-to-right ascending order (e.g., 3-4-5 ), sequences with a
left-to-right descending order (e.g.: 5-4-3 ), and sequences with no monotone
order (no order ; e.g., 5-3-4 or 4-5-3 ). Only number sequences with no order
that did not share any digit location with the corresponding ascending sequence
were selected (i.e., sequences like, e.g., 3-5-4 or 4-3-5 were excluded). As target
stimuli for the parity task, we used a different set of Arabic digits, namely, the
numbers 1, 2, 8, and 9. Thus, half of the target digits in the parity task were
smaller than the digits of the memory task and the other half of the targets were
larger.
Procedure
Figure 5.1 illustrates the sequence of events in one trial. All trials started with
the presentation of a number sequence, where each digit was displayed in the
centre of another placeholder box. Participants were required to memorize all
digits and their relative locations (left, central, and right location) for later recall.
After a presentation time of 2,500 ms, each digit was replaced by a sharp symbol
(’#’) that remained visible for 50 ms. 500 ms later, a fixation cross appeared
in the central placeholder box and was replaced after 1000 ms by a single digit.
Participants’ task was to indicate as soon as possible the parity status (odd
or even) of this number by means of a left or right hand keypress response
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(i.e., pressing the left or right button of the response box). The assignment
of response keys to odd and even digits was balanced across participants. The
digit disappeared after responding or if no response was given after 1000 ms
(missing response). Afterwards, one digit of the previously presented number
sequence was randomly chosen and displayed in each of the three placeholder
boxes. Participants were required to recall the former location of this digit in
the sequence and indicate their answer by pressing the corresponding button of
the response box (i.e., left, central, or right button). There was no time limit
for the location recall. The inter-trial-interval was 2000 ms. In the case of an
incorrect response in the parity or memory task, a 4400 Hz beep sound (lasting
200 ms) was presented as acoustic error feedback.
Design
The digit sequence types (ascending order, descending order, and no order)
were systematically varied between three experimental blocks. Thus, for all
sequences within one block the digits were arranged in the same order. Each
block comprised 72 trials presented in random order. They were composed of
all possible combinations of the four target numbers and the digit sequences of
this particular experimental block. The order of blocks was permutated across
participants. Before the actual experiment started, participants performed 38
randomly chosen training trials.
Data analysis
Trials with incorrect parity judgments or incorrect position recalls were identified
and removed from the reaction times (RT) analyses. We calculated the mean
RT and error rate in the parity task for each participant and each possible
combination of the factors Number Magnitude (small: 1 and 2 ; large: 8 and
9 ), Response Side (left, right), and Sequence Type (ascending order, descending
order, no order) and analyzed the data using repeated measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA). A one-factorial ANOVA was performed on the error rates
in position recall task to test for effects of the sequence type. In all statistical
tests reported in this chapter, a Type I error rate of α = .05 was used.
The SNARC effect in the present paradigm was represented by an interaction
between the factors Number Magnitude and Response Side. In order to obtain
in this type of ANOVA design a standardized estimate of the size of the observed
SNARC effect, we calculated the effect size parameter η2 of this interaction and
its 95% confidences interval CI (see Smithson, 2001). Since the parameter η2
provides an estimation of the proportion of variance accounted by the effect, it
represents a generalization of the correlation coefficient r2. The SNARC effect
size ηˆ2
snarc
allows therefore a direct comparison with studies employing regression
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5.2 Experiment 1
Table 5.1: Percentages of Errors in Experiment 1 and 2. Error Rates in Parity Judgment
Task are Presented as a Function of the Factors Sequence Type, Response Side, and Number
Magnitude. Errors Rates in the Position Recall Task are Presented as a Function for the
Factor Sequence Type.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Asc Des No Asc Des No
Parity Judgment Task
Left Hand - Small Number 1.28 2.90 1.26 1.83 1.80 1.29
Left Hand - Large Number 1.81 2.55 2.04 7.07 6.86 6.00
Right Hand - Small Number 3.57 1.80 2.27 6.47 5.56 6.80
Right Hand - Large Number 0.52 2.78 1.81 1.91 3.10 0.56
Position Recall Task 1.41 1.18 1.14 3.64 2.46 3.59
Note. Asc = Ascending Order; Des = Desecending Order; No = No Order.
5.2.3 Discussion
A SNARC effect was present if participants memorized an ascending number
sequence but vanished completely in the block where the order of descending
number sequences had to be recalled. Since a SNARC effect was also found for
sequences of no monotonic order, we can exclude that the dissociation of the
effect was merely the result of a higher task difficulty in the descending block or
a general cognitive effect of the increased memory load. Moreover, the lack of a
SNARC effect did not reflect any speed-accuracy trade-off because the analysis
of error rates in the parity judgment and position recall task did not reveal
any effect of the sequence type. Thus, the results of Experiment 1 clearly show
that the SNARC effect is modulated by the cognitive coding of short descending
number sequences. More specifically, the spatial representations of numbers in
the parity task were affected by the specific spatial coding requirements and the
resulting memory traces of the second task.
Since the manipulation of the sequence type was varied only between the three
experimental blocks, the internal ordering of the digits was known before the
trial started. It is therefore likely that the knowledge about the ordering of the
upcoming sequence has been used to simplify the coding and recall of the num-
ber locations. That is, participants may have used in the block of descending
sequences the concept of right-to-left orientated number line as strategy to code
the digit location. This mnemonic strategy of a reversed number line, however,
is in conflict with the spatial-numerical coding in the parity task and may there-
fore explain the vanishing of the SNARC effect. Alternatively, it might be also
possible that the mere coding of three digits in a descending order automati-
cally activates a spatially reversed mental number line and interferes therefore
with the subsequent spatial coding of numbers. In order to distinguish between
93
5 Intention and Number Processing
these two accounts-automatic activation of opposite number lines versus selected
memory strategy-we performed a second experiment.
5.3 Experiment 2
Experiment 1 has demonstrated that the SNARC effect vanishes if the actual
memory task required a coding of numbers arranged in descending order. Ex-
periment 2 tests whether the same interference can be observed if the type of
ordering is randomized on trial-by-trial basis. If the sequence type is not pre-
dictable, participants cannot use their prior knowledge about the sequence or-
dering to code the digit locations. Consequently, we should expect the SNARC
effect to be unaffected by the sequence type in the memory task, if a coding
strategy of oriented number lines was responsible for the inhibition of spatial-
numerical associations. If, however, the mere representation of three numbers in
a descending order results automatically in an activation of a reversed number
line, we expect the SNARC effect to be modulated by the sequence coding as it
was the case in Experiment 1.
5.3.1 Method
Participants
Twenty-two students of the Radboud University Nijmegen (4 males; average
age: 22.2; participated in Experiment 2 in return for course credits. None of
them took part in the previous experiment.
Apparatus, stimuli, procedure, design and data analysis
The experimental setup, stimuli, procedure and data analysis were identical to
Experiment 1. The only modification was related to the order of trial presen-
tation. Again, participants ran through three experimental blocks of 72 trials.
However, instead of varying the factor Sequence Type between blocks, all trials
were this time fully randomized. Thus, each experimental block comprised trials
with all three types of digit ordering.
5.3.2 Results
As found before, there were no effects of the Sequence Type in the error rates of
the parity judgment task and position recall task, F (2, 42) < 1 and F (2, 42) =
1.52, respectively (see Table 5.1). The ANOVA of the judgment errors revealed
an interaction between Response Side and Number Magnitude, F (1, 21) = 15.15,
p < .001, ηˆ2 = .42, reflecting a SNARC effect in the accuracy data. That is,
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5.3.3 Discussion
Experiment 2 revealed that if digit ordering varied randomly, SNARC effect was
not affected by the coding of number locations between trials and was now also
present when participants memorized digits in a descending order. It can be
therefore concluded that the mere coding of a digit sequence in the memory
task was not sufficient to affect the spatial representation of numbers in the par-
ity task. This argues against the explanation that the findings in Experiment 1
were the result of an automatic activation of two oppositely oriented mental
number lines. Rather, Experiment 2 suggests that participants were unable to
adopt a strong spatial coding strategy for sequences. Apparently, participants
represent the sequences under these circumstances as three independent num-
bers without their inner structure and did not activate the concept of a mental
number line. Thus, the results of Experiment 2 support the account that it was
the cognitive strategy in the memory task of Experiment 1 that influenced the
spatial representation of numbers in the parity task.
5.4 General Discussion
The present study demonstrates that the cognitive association of numbers and
space is influenced by current task demands. We observed that the SNARC
effect in a parity task is mediated by the specific sequential order involved in
a simultaneously performed unrelated numerical task. This finding is inconsis-
tent with the assumption of an automatic obligatory spatial representation of
numbers along the mental number line. Since a SNARC effect was found under
dual task conditions when the memorized number sequences had no internal
monotonic order (Experiment 1), as well as when the number ordering was
unpredictable (Experiment 2), the observed interference with the descending
sequences in the first experiment cannot be due to an increased task difficulty
or a higher cognitive load in general. Moreover, this mediation of the SNARC
effect was not due to any sequence-specific speed-accuracy trade-off. We argue
consequently that the specific requirement to maintain a short-term memory
representation of numbers in a descending order was responsible for the lack of
spatial-numerical associations in the parity judgment task.
Interestingly, the SNARC effect was only sensitive to the sequential order of
the memory representations if all number sequences within one experimental
block were identically ordered (Experiment 1), but not if the sequence type
was fully randomized (Experiment 2). This dissociation in the SNARC effect
can be explained by the use of different coding strategies when sequences types
were blocked or completely randomized. That is, if numbers are repetitively
arranged in a descending order, participants seem to use the information about
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the right-to-left digit ordering to simplify the processing of the number locations.
This activated spatial-numerical frame of reference, however, is in conflict with
the representation of magnitude along a left-to-right oriented mental number
line and seems to result in an absence of spatial-numerical associations. In
other words, we interpret that the use of spatial strategies in the memory task
modulated the spatial coding of numbers for parity judgments. The outcome of
the present study is therefore consistent with the notion that the SNARC effect
is driven by top-down processes and provides direct empirical support for the
idea of a strategic origin of the mental number line (Fischer, 2006).
In contrast to our interpretation that the SNARC effect depends on the con-
current task requirements, several authors have argued that spatial numerical
associations are driven by an automatic activation of the mental number line.
This idea received so far support from studies showing that numerical magni-
tude information activates spatial codes even under conditions in which number
processing is irrelevant for the task performance (Fias et al., 2001; Gevers et al.,
2006). However, the notion of an automatic SNARC effect implies not only that
spatial codes are evoked by task irrelevant magnitude information. It is also
important to notice that the assumption of automaticity entails by definition
the presence of an obligatory cognitive process, which is immune against the
influence of any other task concurrently executed (Palmeri, 2002). With the
present paradigm, we now provide a direct behavioural test of this prediction
and demonstrate for the first time that SNARC effects are strongly affected un-
der certain dual task conditions. This outcome clearly argues against the idea
that spatial-numerical associations are the result of an automatic and obligatory
cognitive process.
An interesting aspect of the current data is that the SNARC effect disap-
peared, but did not reverse, when descending number sequences were memo-
rized. A reason for this might be that the two tasks were functionally unrelated
and independent from each other. Apparently, participants do not employ a
pre-existing spatial structure that has been activated for one task to process
numbers for another task. Instead, they seem to refrain from spatial number
processing if it is under dual-task conditions in conflict with concurrently acti-
vated and to-be-maintained memory representations. Thus, together with the
finding of a SNARC effect for disordered sequences, which demonstrate the par-
ticipants’ preference for a left-to-right mapping of numbers with space, our data
indicate that this highly overlearned spatial coding strategy can be ignored in
certain situations. The lack of a reversed SNARC effect further suggests that
the coding of numbers along a mental continuum oriented differently than the
default mental number line is a more effortful process that will not be performed
if it is not required or beneficial for solving the task (see Ba¨chthold et al., 1998).
Our report that the spatial coding of numbers is affected by the memory re-
quirements of a second unrelated task substantially extends previous research
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demonstrating that the SNARC effect is sensitive to contextual task-related
information (Dehaene at al., 1993) and affected if participants are explicitly in-
structed to use a different frame of reference for the spatial mapping of numbers
(Ba¨chthold et al., 1998; Vuilleumier et al., 2004; Ristic et al., 2006; Galfano, et
al., 2006). In line with these studies, we demonstrate that left-to-right orienta-
tion of the mental number line is not obligatory and can be easily adapted or
inhibited if the current task requires conceiving numbers differently. Moreover,
our findings demonstrate that the SNARC effect is modulated by the sequen-
tial order of task-irrelevant memory representations and by the activation of
spatial-numerical reference frames in another simultaneously performed task.
Taken together, the present study provides support for the idea that the
spatial coding of numbers is the result of a cognitive coding strategy of how to
deal with numerical magnitude information.
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Epilogue
Ago Ergo Cogito
6 Epilogue
Ago ergo cogito: ’I act, therefore I think’ (Marsh, 2006)
100
6.1 Summary of Findings
The purpose of the current thesis was to shed new light on the functional con-
nections between processes involved in the preparation and execution of motoric
actions and different types of cognitive representations. The major outcomes of
the four different studies consists of the priming of visual motion perception by
motor actions (Chapter 2), the interaction of action planning and word process-
ing (Chapter 3), the priming of grasping actions by numbers (Chapter 4), and
the effect of coding intentions on spatial number representations (Chapter 5).
In the following, I will describe the observed effects in the light of the differ-
ent experimental paradigms developed for the present thesis. Afterwards, I will
briefly discuss the outcome with reference to the principles of embodied coding
as they are described in the introduction.
6.1 Summary of Findings
6.1.1 Motor-Visual Priming of Motion Perception
The study reported in Chapter 2 established a delayed grasping paradigm to
investigate action-induced effects in natural grasping actions. The three behav-
ioral experiments revealed a facilitated detection of visual motions consistent
with a concurrently prepared object manipulation and thus provided evidence
for the presence of motor-visual priming effects in motion perception. Inter-
estingly, it could be demonstrated that the intention to manipulate an object
had affected visual processing already before the actor’s hand had reached out
for the target object. The finding indicated furthermore that the coupling be-
tween perceptual and motor representations in grasping goes beyond visuomotor
associations between object properties and afforded actions.
In the paradigm employed, an action cue instructed participants to grasp
an X-shaped object and to rotate it in a clock- or counterclockwise direction.
Importantly, however, participants had not to execute the motor response at
this point of time and had to delay their response until the onset of a visual
go signal. Experiment 1 (Section 2.2) indicated that if the object had to be
grasped but not manipulated, stimuli that afforded the same type of grip as
the prepared action involved (grip-consistent stimuli) were detected faster than
grip-inconsistent stimuli. If the object had to be rotated, also stimuli consistent
with the intended end-state of the manipulative action were facilitated in visual
processing. In Experiment 2 (Section 2.3), the appearances of the go signals
induced an apparent rotational motion in either a clock- or counterclockwise
direction. Interestingly, under these conditions, stimulus detections were faster
when the induced visual motions were consistent with the intended manual ob-
ject rotation. This interaction between action and motion detection can be
interpreted as evidence for the notion that the processing of action-consistent
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motions is facilitated as a result of motor preparation. Alternatively, however,
it might be possible that the observed effects in the delayed grasping paradigm
were the result of a stimulus-response priming at the level of response initiation.
We conducted therefore a third experiment, in which participants indicated the
detections of visual motions via foot responses. Since the same priming effect
was observed in Experiment 3 (Section 2.4), it could be excluded that the reac-
tion time differences reflected a stimulus-induced facilitation of the execution of
motion-consistent actions. Thus, the outcome of this study provides straightfor-
ward evidence for a new action-induced effect, namely, the motor-visual priming
of motion perception.
6.1.2 Action Word-Processing Interaction
Chapter 3 demonstrated that action-induced effects are not restricted to per-
ceptual processes and showed that they also emerge during semantic processing
involved in word reading. The four reported experiments provided evidence for
an interaction between action planning and word processing. In particular, it
could be shown that the preparation of a tool use action facilitates semantic
judgments about the meaning of words related to the goal location of the pre-
pared action. This result suggests that semantic knowledge about functional
actions becomes selectively activated in the process of motor preparation.
Again, a delayed grasping paradigm was used. Participants in this study,
however, grasped and used one of two meaningful objects (e.g., to drink from
a cup or use a magnifying glass). Additionally, a control condition was in-
troduced in which participants merely lifted one of two fingers (i.e., index or
middle finger) in association with the object’s position. Response initiations
were triggered by word stimuli in a go/no-go lexical decision task. That is,
participants prepared the precued action and executed it as soon as possible, if
the presented stimulus represented a valid Dutch word (go trial). In the case of
a pseudo word, however, it was instructed to withhold from responding (no-go
trial). Word stimuli in Experiment 1 (Section 3.2) were consistent or inconsis-
tent to the action goals of the object use (i.e., mouth or eye). The analysis of
response latencies indicated consistency effects between action preparation and
word processing. That is, when participants prepared to use one of the two
objects (e.g., the cup) lexical decisions were facilitated for words describing the
goal location (e.g., mouth) of the intended action. However, in the finger lifting
condition, reaction times were unaffected. In Experiment 2 (Section 3.3), in
which words were used that described action features primarily relevant of the
finger lifting movements (i.e., left or right), the pattern of effects reversed and
the judgments were now affected by the preparation of finger movements but
not by tool use actions. Interestingly, two further experiments revealed that the
observed actions word-processing interaction crucially depends on the depth of
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semantic processing required for solving the go/no-go task. When subjects made
semantic decisions about the word category (Experiment 3, Section 3.4) consis-
tency effects were present as in the two experiments before. However, when
introducing a letter identification task (Experiment 4, Section 3.5)—a task that
does not require any semantic processing of the words—action word-processing
interactions disappeared completely.
6.1.3 Numerical Magnitude Priming of Actions
Another example for the cognitive interference between grasping actions and
semantic processing is provided in Chapter 4, which investigated the functional
connection between action planning and mathematical cognition. The described
study demonstrates that the processing of numerals affects the coding of size-
related motor features (i.e., grip aperture) during the planning of grasping ac-
tions. The finding of numerical magnitude priming effects in object grasping
supports the notion that the representation of motor actions and the represen-
tation of numerical information share common cognitive codes for magnitude-
related information.
In three experiments, participants performed object-directed movements (i.e.,
grasping or pointing) in response to visually presented small or large Arabic nu-
merals. To be precise, the participants’ task was to judge the parity status of
the numbers and to indicate their decision by performing either a precision or
power grip action (Experiment 1, Section 4.2). The analysis of the grasping
movements revealed that precision grip actions were initiated faster in response
to relatively small numbers (e.g., 1 & 2 ), whereas power grips were faster to
large numbers (e.g., 8 & 9 ). Additionally, the kinematic data showed that max-
imum grip apertures (i.e., maximum distance between thumb and index finger
while reaching out for the target object) were significantly enlarged when the
response was made in presence of a relatively large number. Both effects, the nu-
merical magnitude priming effect in the response latencies and the number effect
in the grasping kinematics, indicate that the processing of abstract magnitude
information has an impact on the planning and execution of prehension actions.
Two control experiments were performed to exclude for possible confounds re-
lated to the relative vertical end position of the reaching movements and the
amount of fingers involved in the two different grip types. Experiment 2 (Sec-
tion 4.3) demonstrated that number effects in the response latencies disappear
when participants perform reaching movements without the intention to grasp
the object (i.e., pointing to the top or bottom part of the object). However, as
shown in Experiment 3 (Section 4.4), numerical magnitude priming effects were
also present when controlling for the number of fingers used for the grasping
action.
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6.1.4 Effects of Coding Strategies in Number Representations
Chapter 5 further investigated the representation of numerical magnitude infor-
mation but shifted the focus of attention from effects of motor intentions to the
effects of coding intentions. The study provided evidence for the notion that the
cognitive link between numbers and space—that is, the representation of mag-
nitude information along a “mental number line”—is the result of a controlled
coding strategy and not driven by an automatic stimulus-response association.
Two experiments were conducted showing that the interaction between nu-
merical size and spatial response features (i.e., the SNARC effect) is mediated
by concurrent task requirements. Participants memorized three Arabic digits
describing a left-to-right ascending, descending, or disordered number sequence
and indicated afterwards the parity status of a centrally presented digit by
means of left/right keypress responses. As the reaction times revealed, the
SNARC effect was only present after memorizing ascending or disordered num-
ber sequences but disappeared after processing descending sequences. In other
words, the SNARC effect was found to be mediated by the specific sequential
order involved in a simultaneously performed unrelated memory task. This ob-
servation is inconsistent with the notion that the spatial coding of numbers is
an automatic and obligatory cognitive process. Interestingly, the SNARC effect
was only sensitive to the sequential order in memory if all number sequences
within one experimental block were identically ordered (Experiment 1, Section
5.2), but not if the sequence type was fully randomized and thus number order-
ing unpredictable (Experiment 2, Section 5.3). This difference suggests that the
participants’ use of spatial mnemonic strategies to simplify the coding of num-
ber sequences have driven the inhibition of the spatial-numerical associations in
the parity judgment task.
6.2 Conclusions
The four behavioral studies reported in this thesis examined the involvement
of motor representations in cognitive information processing ranging from “low-
level” processes such as visual perception up to “high-level” processes such as the
coding of abstract semantic information while word and number reading. The
findings provide, in line with recent psychological and neuroscientific research,
new support for the view that cognition and action are two closely coupled
processes. Importantly, however, the present work goes above and beyond pre-
viously reported action effects in cognitive psychology and extends the literature
at least in four aspects:
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1. The reported experiments are based on grasping paradigms, which ap-
proach the topic of motor interference in the context of natural goal-
directed actions. So far, research in this field has focused mostly on
rather simple and one-dimensional motor responses like, for instance, but-
ton press responses or mere reach-to-grasp movements without object use.
The major advantage of the presented object manipulation paradigms is
that they allow a direct investigation of action goals and the actual in-
tended distal effects in the environment.
2. The grasping experiments illustrated that motor behavior has an impact
on subsequent cognitive processing. A very clear and reliable example for
the existence of action-induced effects represents hereby the motor-visual
priming of motion perception—an effect that can be understood as a form
of perceptual resonance resulting from motor intentions.
3. The experiments highlight the concept of embodied cognition and the in-
volvement of motor representations in perceptual and semantic processing.
In particular, the separation of action planning from execution by delayed
responses has shown that actions effects arise already during goal selec-
tion and processes of motor preparation. Evidence for this is coming from
the finding that action word-processing interference effects occurred at
the level of action goals and were caused by merely prepared and not yet
executed motor responses. The presented results stress therefore the im-
portance of action goals in motor control and embodied cognition. In this
way, they provide strong new evidence for the ideomotor principle, which
holds that actions are represented in terms of their intended consequences,
and for the common coding principle, which emphasizes in this context the
role of distal action effects.
4. The thesis presents straightforward empirical evidence for an action-
oriented approach to mathematical cognition—a functional domain that
has been until now largely neglected by researcher in the field of embodied
cognition. The finding of numerical magnitude priming of grasping actions
is in line with the notion that representations of magnitude information
for both numerals and actions are base on a shared generalized coding
system. The interaction between number processing and object grasping
represents additionally an interesting new cognitive effect that provides
direct behavioral support for the principle of motor resonance. The per-
formed experiments might thus be a promising starting point for future
research on embodied representations in mathematical cognition.
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So far, there is no clear-cut empirical evidence in the literature for action-
inducted interference effects in high-level cognition. Interestingly, however, the
experiments reported here suggest that action-inducted effects seem to exist in
semantic processing. First support for this notion is provided by the finding of
action word-processing interactions under delayed grasping conditions. Since the
study on mathematical cognition aimed to investigate predominantly the effects
of numbers on the planning and execution of actions, we cannot say at this
point whether similar action-inducted interference effects exist in the processing
of symbolic magnitude information. Future studies on action effects in semantic
processing of words and numbers should therefore focus more strongly on the
directionality of observed interference effects. The involvement of a second motor
effector, as demonstrated in the study on visual motion perception (Chapter 2),
seems to offer in this connection a promising method to test the directionality
of action effects in high-level cognition.
Taken together, the present thesis demonstrates that functional connections
between motor actions and cognitive processes are not restricted to certain re-
sponse complexities or motor effectors and not to specific types of information
or representational domains. All reported experimental findings thus support
the hypothesis initially formulated in the introduction that the involvement of
motor representations reflects a universal coding principle of the brain to deal
with different kinds of cognitive demands. Abstract cognition and motor action
can be consequently understood as two mutually depended processes, which pre-
suppose each other. One might therefore reverse the intuitively plausible notion
that “motor behavior requires cognition” and end the thesis with the statement
that “cognition requires motor behavior”.
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Summery in Dutch
Nederlandse Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift probeert de relatie tussen de processen betrokken bij het voor-
bereiden van motorische acties en cognitieve informatieverwerking te doorgron-
den. De meeste klassieke cognitief psychologische theoriee¨n nemen impliciet
aan, dat actie puur als het gevolg van cognitieve informatieverwerking ontstaat
of zelfs dat actie een triviaal aanhangsel is aan de lange keten van cognitieve pro-
cessen tussen de stimulus en de reactie. Een strikte scheiding tussen motorische
actie aan de ene kant en perceptie en cognitie aan de andere zou echter niet een
juist beeld geven van de werkelijke aard van de doelgerichte informatieverwerk-
ing en het intentionele gedrag van de mens. Dit proefschrift richt zich daarom
voornamelijk op de interacties tussen bewegen en denken met als theoretisch doel
empirisch bewijs te vinden voor de veronderstelling dat cognitie direct gekop-
peld is aan onze ervaringen in onze omgeving, vaak aangeduid met “embodied
cognition”. Uit de vier onderzoekslijnen behorende bij dit proefschrift blijkt dat
motorische representaties betrokken zijn bij verschillende cognitieve domeinen,
van laag (denk bijvoorbeeld aan visuele perceptie) tot hoog cognitief niveau
(denk bijvoorbeeld aan het coderen van abstracte semantische informatie, zoals
het lezen van woorden en getallen).
De koppeling tussen perceptie en actie in het algemeen en de door actie
veroorzaakte effecten in het bijzonder zijn nader onderzocht in Hoofdstuk 2.
We hebben hier een uitgesteld-respons paradigma (“delayed-response paradigm”)
ontwikkeld, dat het mogelijk maakte om cognitieve effecten te bestuderen met
natuurlijke grijpbewegingen. Omdat elke objectmanipulatie ervoor zorgt dat de
waargenomen bewegingen worden ervaren als het gevolg van een actie, hadden
wij verwacht dat het plannen van een objectmanipulatie direct de verwerking van
visuele bewegingen zou be¨ınvloeden. De drie experimenten van dit hoofdstuk
leveren hier inderdaad bewijs voor. We hebben kunnen laten zien dat het de-
tecteren van visuele bewegingen sneller gaat als deze bewegingen overeenkomen
met de op dat moment beoogde en voorbereide motorische actie (bijvoorbeeld
het sneller detecteren van een rotatiebeweging met de klok mee als men ook in
deze richting het object wil roteren). Deze interactie tussen het plannen van ac-
ties en het detecteren van bewegingen (oftewel ”motor-visual priming of motion
perception” in het Engels) is een duidelijk bewijs voor het bestaan van door actie
veroorzaakte effecten in de waarneming in overeenstemming met de verwachting
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dat het verwerken van actie-consistente bewegingen vergemakkelijkt wordt door
motorische voorbereiding.
Ook in Hoofdstuk 3 hebben we een vergelijkbaar paradigma gebruikt om
te demonstreren dat de effecten van motorische voorbereiding niet beperkt bli-
jven tot het visuele domein. De hoofdvraag van deze experimentele lijn was of
het plannen van doelgerichte acties interfereerde met talige cognitieve processen.
Middels vier experimenten hebben we gekeken naar de invloed van de voorberei-
ding op het reiken naar, grijpen van en gebruiken van betekenisvolle voorwerpen
(bijvoorbeeld een kopje of een loep) op het verwerken van semantische informatie
in verschillende woordbenoemingstaken (bijvoorbeeld de opdracht tot een lexi-
cale decisie of een semantische categorisatie taak). De analyse toegepast op de
reactietijden liet een interactie zien tussen actieplanning en woordverwerking (of-
tewel “action word-processing interaction” in het Engels). We hebben laten zien
dat de voorbereiding van een beweging met een gebruiksvoorwerp (bijvoorbeeld
het grijpen naar een kopje om te drinken) semantische beslissingen bevordert
over de betekenissen van woorden die gerelateerd zijn aan de doellocatie van
de voorbereide actie (bijvoorbeeld het woord mond). Deze bevinding impliceert
dat semantische kennis over functionele acties selectief wordt geactiveerd tijdens
het proces van motorische voorbereiding en dat deze kennis interacteert met de
processen in andere domeinen, in dit geval taal.
Een ander voorbeeld van cognitieve interferentie tussen het grijpen van een
object en de daarmee gepaard gaande semantische verwerking is weergegeven in
Hoofdstuk 4. Hier werd de functionele relatie tussen actieplanning en mathe-
matische cognitie onder de loep genomen. Deze onderzoekslijn laat zien dat de
verwerking van getallen invloed heeft op het coderen van grootte-gerelateerde
motorische kenmerken (bijvoorbeeld de opening van de hand) tijdens het plan-
nen van een grijpactie (oftewel “numerical magnitude priming of grasping ac-
tions” in het Engels). De deelnemers werden ge¨ınstrueerd om de pariteit (even
of oneven) van de gepresenteerde Arabische getallen aan te geven door het uitvo-
eren van een fijne of een grove grijpbeweging. De analyse van de reactietijden liet
zien dat het reageren op lage getallen (bijvoorbeeld 1 en 2) sneller van start ging
voor fijne grijpbewegingen terwijl het reageren op hogere getallen (bijvoorbeeld,
8 en 9) sneller werd gestart voor de grove grijpbewegingen. Daarnaast hebben
we kunnen laten zien dat de maximale handopening (d.w.z., de maximale af-
stand tussen de duim en de wijsvinger tijdens het reiken naar het doelobject)
vergroot was als de grijpbewegingen uitgevoerd werden als reactie op een re-
latief hoog getal. Samenvattend demonstreert deze onderzoekslijn dat getal-
en actierepresentaties een gemeenschappelijke cognitieve metriek hebben voor
grootte-gerelateerde informatie. Bovendien ondersteunen deze bevindingen het
algemeen idee van ‘motorische resonantie’ (“motor resonance”) uitgelokt door
de verwerking van symbolische informatie.
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InHoofdstuk 5 hebben we verder getallenrepresentaties onderzocht en vooral
gekeken naar het fenomeen van de interactie tussen numerieke grootheid en
gelateraliseerde motorische responses (oftewel “spatial numerical association of
response codes” of afgekort het “SNARC effect” in het Engels). Doormiddel
van twee getalverwerkingsexperimenten werd de idee getest dat de cognitieve
koppeling tussen getallen en ruimtelijke kenmerken van responses voornamelijk
ontstaat door de cognitieve strategie die het individu vormt om te kunnen om-
gaan met (of een representatie te kunnen maken van) abstracte numerieke infor-
matie. De deelnemers werden gevraagd om een reeks van getallen te onthouden,
die van links naar rechts toenam (bijv., 3-4-5), afnam (bijv. 5-4-3) of geen lin-
eaire richting had (bijv., 5-3-4). Direct na de reeks kregen de deelnemer een
getal te zien waarvan ze gevraagd werden de pariteitstatus aan te geven door
een linker of een rechterknop in te drukken. De analyse van de reactietijden liet
zien dat het SNARC effect van de pariteitstaak be¨ınvloed wordt door de coder-
ingskenmerken van de geheugentaak. Specifiek gesproken hebben we gevonden
dat het SNARC effect alleen aanwezig was nadat men een getallenreeks had on-
thouden die van links naar rechts toenam of geen richting had. Na het onthouden
van een afnemende getallenreeks was het effect verdwenen. Deze onderzoekslijn
levert dus bewijs op voor de idee dat de cognitieve relatie tussen getallen en
ruimte, of de interne representatie van magnitude informatie langs een ‘mentale
getallijn’, ontstaat als gevolg van een gecontroleerde codingsstrategie en niet
door een automatische stimulus-respons koppeling.
Al met al leveren de hier beschreven experimentele bevindingen, die in overeen-
stemming zijn met ander recent gedrags- en neurowetenschappelijke onderzoek,
nieuw bewijs op voor de veronderstelling dat de cognitie en actie twee nauw met
elkaar verbonden processen zijn. Belangrijker nog, het hier gepresenteerde werk
overstijgt de eerder gerapporteerde actie-effecten binnen de cognitieve psycholo-
gie en verbreedt de bestaande literatuur minstens op de volgende vier punten:
1. De experimenten in dit proefschrift benaderen het onderwerp van motorische-
interferentie-effecten in de context van natuurlijke object manipulaties.
Een dergelijk benadering maakt het mogelijk effecten van doelgerichte ac-
ties en hun causale gevolgen direct in de omgeving te bestuderen.
2. De grijpexperimenten illustreren dat het plannen van motorische acties
gevolgen heeft voor andere daaropvolgende cognitieve processen.
3. De experimenten bevestigen het concept van embodied cognition en de
betrokkenheid van motorische representaties in de perceptuele en seman-
tische verwerking van de omgeving.
4. Dit proefschrift laat empirisch bewijs zien voor een actie-georienteerde
benadering van mathematische cognitie; een functioneel domein dat tot
op heden genegeerd werd door onderzoekers binnen het onderzoeksveld
van embodied cognition.
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Kort samengevat tonen de hoofdbevindingen van dit proefschrift aan dat
het functionele verband tussen motorische acties en cognitieve processen voor
meerdere typen informatie (bewegingswaarneming, talige en grootte waarnem-
ing) geldt en betrekking heeft op verschillende representationele domeinen (taal,
perceptie en mathematiek). Met andere woorden, de bevindingen ondersteunen
de idee dat de betrokkenheid van motorische representaties een universeel coder-
ingsprincipe van de hersenen is, dat toegepast wordt op verschillende typen cog-
nitieve taken. Op grond hiervan is het mijn overtuiging dat de abstracte cognitie
en die processen die nodig zijn voor motorische bewegingen alleen begrepen kun-
nen worden als twee van elkaar afhankelijke en zelfs direct op elkaar berustende
processen.
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